by R. Ari Enkin

It is customary in synagogues worldwide for the rabbi or other designated individual to deliver a drasha – a sermon – every Shabbat morning. In most congregations the drasha is delivered immediately prior to the silent Mussaf amida, while in others it may be given before the Torah reading service.¹ In other congregations, it is given at the conclusion of the Haftara even before commencing any of the preliminary Mussaf prayers. One will occasionally find congregations where the drasha is given at the conclusion of the entire service. As we will see, it might just be that the different customs as to when the rabbi should deliver his drasha are all based on different halachic considerations.

It seems that the custom for the rabbi to deliver his Shabbat drasha immediately before the start of Mussaf originates in the Talmudic era, and it is likely the earliest recorded source regarding the placement of the weekly drasha.² On the other hand, there were many congregations and communities throughout history which placed the drasha prior to the Torah reading. Among the reasons for this was in order to allow the mourners the opportunity of reciting an extra Kaddish following the drasha, which would best be inserted at this time.³ Additionally, as the drasha is usually based on the weekly parsha, delivering the drasha at this time allows the congregation a “sneak preview” of the Torah reading. A good drasha with inspiring interpretations no doubt assists the congregation in better focusing on the Torah reading. For these and other reasons, Rabbi Dov Lior is of the opinion that the drasha is best delivered at this time.⁴

In most congregations today the drasha is given after the Torah reading, before Mussaf. There is some discussion, however, as to exactly which point before Mussaf it should be inserted. According to some authorities, the drasha should be given before the start of “Ashrei”. This is because Ashrei is the prayer which formally begins the Mussaf service. It is argued, therefore, that inserting the drasha at this point is preferable as it allows for an uninterrupted flow of the Mussaf service.

Others are of the opinion that it is preferable for the drasha to be given after the Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh, immediately preceding the kaddish and silent Mussaf Amida, which is the most widespread custom today. Some have questioned this approach, however, as it is generally preferable not to have any unnecessary interruption between “ashrei” and kaddish. Nevertheless, this concern is readily dismissed by the Maharam Schik, who rules that Torah study (the drasha) is not something which is to be considered a forbidden interruption between Ashrei and the kaddish. He concludes that congregations which insert the drasha at this point are certainly conducting themselves properly, though he personally favors placing the drasha before the Torah reading in order to avoid any question whatsoever.⁵

In many congregations the rabbi delivers his drasha following the Haftara, even before Ashrei and the returning of the Torah to the Aron Kodesh. This arrangement has been opposed by some on the grounds that it is not proper to unnecessarily postpone the return of the Torah to the Aron Kodesh.⁶ It is for this reason that in many congregations the megilla is read on Purim morning only after the Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh. Similarly, whenever a brit is to take place in the synagogue on Shabbat morning it is generally performed after the Torah has been put away.  Nevertheless, most authorities allow a drasha, brit, or megilla reading to take place while the Torah remains on the bima. It is argued that the mitzva value of such activities justifies performing them even before the Torah is put away.

Finally, the custom of delivering the drasha at the conclusion of the entire service may originate in the words of the Rambam who writes that “the sermon which is customarily delivered on Shabbat is to be given immediately before proceeding with the Shabbat meal”.⁷ All approaches are equally legitimate.

On a related note, there have been authorities in the past who have frowned upon the practice of delivering a drasha from the bima. They argue that standing with one’s back towards the aron kodesh shows a lack of respect for the Torah.⁸ However, most authorities disagree and maintain that there is little basis for such a concern, especially once the Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh.⁹ It is also noted that the drasha is infrequent and brief in nature and the speaker’s back is not constantly facing the aron kodesh.¹⁰ Finally, considering that the purpose of the drasha is in order to teach and inspire the congregation in the ways of the Torah, something which the Torah itself advocates doing, there can be no mistake that anything irreverent is taking place.¹¹ It goes without saying, however, that one must never stand with one’s back towards an actual Torah scroll.¹²

1. Mateh Ephraim 602:42. ↩

2. Berachot 28b, Rashi s.v. “lo al l’pirka“. ↩

3. Chikrei Minhagim (Gurary) Vol. II p.96. ↩

4. http://www.yeshiva.org.il/ask/?id=17988 ↩

5. Maharam Schik 126. ↩

6. Torat Yekutiel 55, cited in Chikrei Minhagim (Gurary) Vol. II p.99. ↩

7. Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 23:19. ↩

8. Based on YD 282:1. ↩

9. Taz, YD 282:1. ↩

10. Pri Megadim, OC 150; Shaar Hatziun 150:13. ↩

11. Aruch Hashulchan, YD 282:2. See there for more. ↩

12. YD 282:1; Aruch Hashulchan, OC 282:1. ↩

by Aron White

A central feature of the thought of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik is the concept of a Mesorah community. Jews are conceived as part of a shared community spanning generations, with a shared religious and spiritual mission and destiny. (Recently this concept was summarised in an article on this website.)

However, I think that this concept is in danger. I believe that today, the average Jew is far less conscious, in a daily, existential way, of being part of an age-old tradition, than Jews of other eras were.

It is very difficult, maybe impossible, to fully understand the components of another person`s identity, certainly when talking about a person one never met. Nevertheless, three factors lead me to the conclusion that we are less conscious of our past than Jews living in previous eras.

First, most of the world’s Jews live in relatively young Jewish communities. 150 years ago the largest Jewish communities were in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (outside Israel) and North Africa. Today, 80% of the world’s Jews live in Israel and America. There are surely a higher number of Jews today who are only second or third generation in their land of birth than at most points in Jewish history. The old stories of shuls that dated back to eternity, families living in the same city for generation after generation, even century after century, whilst obviously never applying to the whole Jewish people, certainly describe even fewer Jews today. The city of Bnei Brak, now home to around 180,000 Jews and maybe the spiritual centre of Charedi Jewry, was only built in 1924. We have few daily reminders of the Jews who lived one, two, three hundred years ago simply because we live thousands of kilometres away from the place of their homes, schools, shuls and cemeteries.

A second factor that undermines our connection to our past is the style of contemporary Jewish education. Dr. Haym Soloveitchik famously argued that as we moved from the Shtetl to open Western societies, Jewish education shifted from being a function of the home and street to a function of the school. When we lived in closed communities, the home, and by extension, tradition, were seen as true expressions of Judaism, capable of accurately transmitting the Jewish tradition to the next generation. As we became more westernised, our culture and community became infiltrated with other values; books and study, rather than the practise and experience of the home, became the focus. The role of tradition in Jewish education has been reduced.

Together, these forces have caused us to lose the sense of being part of an age-old tradition in a meaningful, tangible way. We live in relatively new communities and have ceased to see the chain of family tradition as a method of transmitting Judaism. Is there any way to revive the Mesorah consciousness, for people to feel part of an age old tradition in a daily, tangible way?

The answer came to me, as many answers do, in Tzfat. I was attending a Shabbat meal at the home of a local family. After the head of the table cut the challa, a guest at the table, a convert from Scandinavia, turned to me and made a striking comment. She said, in an offhand manner, but with a seriousness that is hard to describe, the following:

When I see the head of the table cutting the challa, all I can see is the ghost of his father cutting the challa, and the ghost of his father cutting the challa, and so on, for generation upon generation. And then I see the ghost of his son cutting the challa, and the ghost of his son cutting the challa, and so on for generation upon generation. I am a convert, and also I biologically cannot have children. When I cut the challa, it is just me, cutting the challa.

It is not just the technical mitzvos performance, but the experience of mitzvos, the folklore of mitzvos, that is also consistent across generations. My mother always points out that certain pages in the Haggada are dirtier than others, and in different ways. The page which contains the brachos for matza always has crumbs in it, leftovers from previous years Seder night. The pages at which we drink the cups of wine, and the page where we read out the makkos, and dip our finger in to the cup, normally are stained red. Last summer, I was in the Jewish Museum in Amsterdam, where among other things, there were a number of beautiful handwritten and decorated Haggados from the 17^th century displayed. One was open to the page of the makkos. The hand that had dipped into the wine hundreds of years ago had left the telltale wine drops on the page.

Jews have spilled wine on their Haggados for centuries. The wrapping of the child under the tallis during Birkas Kohanim, the serene moment of prayer after the lighting of the Shabbat candles, the tune of Kol Nidrei, are identical across time.

The connection to our Mesorah, to those generations before us, is present in so much of what we do. We just need to look for the ghosts.

▪ Statement by the Orthodox Union and RCA on the Arrest by Israel of Jewish Suspects in Killing of Palestinian Teen
▪ Agudath Israel statement on arrests in murder of Arab boy
▪ About the Beit Yitzchak
▪ Origins of Yiddish Are Anything But Understood
▪ Broyde: What is Bothering the Aruch Hashulchan? Women Wearing Tefillin
▪ English Words with Hebrew Origins
▪ ‘Indiana Jones’ of the Cairo Genizah
▪ As R Aviner points out, most beggars are swindlers, which creates a charity dilemma: Panhandlers dress as Jews to beg from Orthodox

A disingenuous animal welfare article stabs Jewish community interests in the back

by R. Ari Zivotofsky

A growing number of US rabbis are engaged in advancing extra-halachic moral issues. While these are often worthy endeavors, it is imperative that they be promoted in a positive rather than negative manner. That is, the inherent good of the cause needs to be emphasized, rather than merely appearing to be morally superior by denigrating others. In addition, in order to maintain credibility, honesty must be strictly adhered to.

A text-book example of how not to do it was recently demonstrated in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article Why This Rabbi is Swearing off Kosher Meat (Houses of Worship, May 29, 2014) by Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz. The missive was a broad based attack on a huge swath of the kosher industry that contained misinformation and clever but dishonest tactics. I would first like to address the general issue of sticking to the positive and then briefly mention the specifics of this article.

I can speculate that by publishing this article in the WSJ, Yanklowitz may have had one of two goals in mind. He may have been hoping to influence the meat or dairy industries to radically overhaul their practices. The likelihood of a Yanklowitz article in the WSJ leading to such a change is negligible in my mind, comparable to the YCT modifying their modus operandi based on a Rabbi Avi Shafran article in Mishpacha magazine. Alternatively, the goal may have been to proselytize to the uninitiated and convince others to “boycott” kosher animal products. Possible, but I think unlikely that an article in the WSJ will persuade somebody to become a vegetarian.

Unfortunately, other than publicly declaring his moral superiority, a very likely result of Yanklowitz’s article is that when Jewish communal organizations are called upon to defend shechita in Europe or other places, the secular governments will now have one more piece of ammunition. They can pull out an article by a prominent “Orthodox” rabbi in the influential WSJ which supports their claim that shechita is unethical. I have personally been involved in shechita defense for many years, working behind the scenes clarifying the scientific and halachic facts about kosher slaughter to keep it legal in jurisdictions where that is threatened, and this is not a far-fetched scenario. It may not have been Yanklowitz’s intention, but it is, sadly, a likely result.

A few specifics about this article. He opens by setting up the strawman of kosher being healthier and then knocks it down. For Jews and Jewish law it was never about health and if he so claims, it is merely a sly tactic to then malign kosher.

He devotes a large section to factory farming and claims that his big beef is with those practices. If that is true, then he should write an article about why he hates factory farming and therefore went vegan. But he should not use his abhorrence of modern animal husbandry to malign the kosher industry, thereby harming the many observant Jews who still want to legitimately eat meat, including some who require it for health reasons.

He devotes considerable space to the treatment of downed (sic) calves. While this practice may be inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the kosher meat industry which does not use such animals, a fact that Rabbi Yanklowitz surely knows. He talks about “story after story” of Israeli kosher-slaughterhouse scandals. You can count the scandals (which are unfortunate and most certainly should be dealt with) on one hand. They are few and infrequent.

What makes this article truly disturbing is the blatant dishonesty involved. The article implies that after much painful soul-searching Yanklowitz recently reached his conclusion to stop eating kosher meat. In reality, he has been a vegan for several years. His ethical decision is not based on a new epiphany and it relates to all animal products. His eating habits are not related specifically to the manner in which kosher meat is slaughtered. This intentional misleading is nothing less than gneivat da’at.

Most Orthodox Jews who embrace vegetarianism do so with commendable motivations and do not feel a need to malign kosher slaughter to justify their choice. In contrast, Yanklowitz attacks the kosher industry, yet concludes with a personal prayer that the kosher meat and dairy industries will yet rectify their ways; implying that if so, he might renounce his veganism. If I invite him to a BBQ with a backyard raised lamb that I personally schecht gently and with compassion, will he partake? When the sacrifices are reinstated, as Orthodox Jews daily pray for, will he willingly eat from the Paschal sacrifice, after it is lovingly processed by our holy kohanim?

If Yanklowitz chooses to forego meat and other animal products he is entitled to his choice. He is not entitled to stand on a soap box and publicly misrepresent the facts about kosher slaughter. There are two serious problems with this WSJ article – the potential misuse of it and the deceit in its presentation. His claims, stated and implied, are false and destructive. In his stab at promoting animal welfare he is (I hope inadvertently!) harming the interests of the global Jewish community.

She’nishma bsorot tovot.

▪ R Stav: Where are the Religious Leaders on the Other Side?
▪ Sad but inevitable: Does Judaism Need Gender?
▪ Evangelicals Are Changing Their Minds on Gay Marriage
▪ R Eisenman: What Now?
▪ The state of boys’ yeshiva education: Klal Perspectives – Summer 2014
▪ Just in time for the Three Weeks: Ultra-Orthodox initiative for adherence to ban on Internet usage begins in Beit Shemesh
▪ Doomed N.Y. Firefighter Saved 7-Year-Old Hasidic Boy’s Life After Garage Mishap

by Joel Rich

Hypothetical question: Are there any halachic bounds restricting or forbidding a member of an investment committee of a community institution from profiting on the investments of the institution (e.g. a hedge fund manager investing the organization’s money in his hedge fund)?

I was wondering if you know of any academic research into the custom of mourning for one’s in-laws. In particular what occurred that in S”A Y”D 374:6 we go from a requirement to mourn, to a “yesh omrim” in the Rama that the minhag changed and then to his saying that anyone doing so being one of the matmihim?

Please direct any informal comments to audioroundup613@comcast.net.

by David Roth

For many years, gelatin–which is typically derived from non-kosher sources–has posed a potential problem for kosher consumers and been a major subject of debate among halachic authorities. However, recent developments in gelatin production might cause a problem even for those who have been historically lenient.

Gelatin is defined as 1. a nearly transparent, faintly yellow, odorless, and almost tasteless glutinous substance obtained by boiling in water the ligaments, bones, skin, etc., of animals, and forming the basis of jellies, glues, and the like. 2. any of various similar substances, [such] as vegetable gelatin.¹ Vegetable gelatin has few if any kashrus concerns but gelatin derived from animals has generated vibrant discussion.

Although according to the above definition gelatin can be made from ligaments, bones, skin, etc., of animals, the discussions of halachic authorities appear to be exclusively regarding the bones. If the gelatin comes from a kosher animal that has been slaughtered properly, it is kosher and pareve² according to everyone. Today, a major source of kosher gelatin is the bones of kosher fish.

Gelatin and Bones

The Gemara³ says that one who cooks bones with milk is exempt from punishment because the bones do not have the status of meat on a Biblical level, which is codified in Shulchan Aruch.⁴ The Gemara further states that if a non-kosher piece of boned meat falls into an otherwise kosher mixture, the bone counts as part of the kosher to nullify the non-kosher meat,⁵ or at the very least do not count towards the forbidden part.⁶

Although in general the bones are still rabbinically prohibited, in the case of gelatin there may be even more room for leniency because the bones are completely unfit for human consumption. They were never included in the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal in the first place. This is similar to a case described by the Rama,⁷ who permits putting milk into an animal’s stomach which is completely dry like wood, since it is no longer considered meat. The Shach⁸ writes that the same applies to any innards of an animal, such as bones.⁹

Based on the above, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski¹⁰ permits the use of gelatin from a non-kosher animal. An additional consideration of his is that the processing of the gelatin makes the bones inedible for even the consumption of a dog. Therefore, the bones, even when reconstituted in the form of gelatin, are considered “changed” (nishtanu) in the process and unconnected to the original non-kosher product. He also noted that gelatin is almost always used in a way that it is nullified by sixty (i.e., it is less than one sixtieth) in the finished product.¹¹ This is also the position of R. Ovadia Yosef¹² and can be inferred from the responsa of R. David Tzvi Hoffman.¹³ R. Yechezkel Abramsky¹⁴ also proposed this approach but cautioned against leniency, out of fear that permitting something which had previously been assumed to be prohibited will lead to people being lax about the halachic process in general.¹⁵

Forbidden Bones

However, R. Aharon Kotler¹⁶ argues that the reason that bones are not included in the prohibition of eating non-kosher animals is simply because they are unfit for human consumption. However, if they are reconstituted into gelatin, they are fit to eat and the prohibition returns. This is because he holds that when the prohibited item itself is reconstituted, as opposed to just being mixed up with other things to make it possible to eat the bones, the bones themselves will become like the meat. If so, at the very least there is a problem of achshvei (showing that this item has importance), which renders the item rabbinically prohibited.¹⁷ This is also the position of R. Moshe Feinstein.¹⁸ R. Yitzchok Yaakov Weiss¹⁹ likewise writes that gelatin from bones of non-kosher animals has been determined to be forbidden by most Halachic authorities (al pi daas rov minyan u’binyan shel gedolei ha’torah). R. Eliyahu Henkin is also stringent on gelatin made from bones of non-kosher animals.²⁰

R. Tzvi Pesach Frank²¹ takes an interesting middle approach: he argues that if the bones are only rendered unfit from human consumption, but still fit for a dog’s consumption, is a matter of debate. It is contingent on the halachic argument between the Noda b’Yehuda and the Shach about whether the above-mentioned Rama, who permits putting milk into an animal’s stomach that is completely dry like wood, also applies to the stomach of a non-kosher animal. Was the Rama only lenient about the prohibition of meat and milk or even about non-kosher animals? However, if the bones are rendered unfit even from the consumption of a dog, they should be permitted by all. He concludes that until we better determine the actual situation, one should be stringent, but one should not tell those who are lenient that they are acting incorrectly.

Recent Developments

It is also important to realize that the production process today may not be the same as that dealt with in the decades-old responsa mentioned above. The Kosharot organization in Israel²² has made the claim that today most gelatin is made from fresh bones, in which case the leniency of dried bones would no longer apply. Therefore, the gelatin made from these fresh bones of non-kosher animals should be forbidden according to all halachic authorities.

R. Yaakov Ariel²³ responded that even if it is true that gelatin is made from fresh animal bones, the second leniency still applies. In the process of making gelatin, the bones are rendered inedible to a dog. He concludes that it is proper to be strict on that matter, but objects to calling it non-kosher.

The Kosharot organization responded²⁴ agreeing with R. Ariel that if the gelatin was indeed made inedible to a dog in the process that it would indeed be kosher according to some halachic authorities. However, they deny that this is what actually happens in the process of extracting gelatin.²⁵ Accordingly, even the lenient authorities would have to rule strictly if the facts as reported by Kosharot are confirmed.

The OU and most mainstream kashrus organizations in America are stringent like R. Aharon Kotler and R. Moshe Feinstein; they only certify gelatin that is made from the bones of kosher fish, or from kosher animals which have been slaughtered properly.²⁶ I have found conflicting sources regarding the policies of the Rabbanut in Israel.²⁷

 

1. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gelatin?s=t ↩

2. Igros Moshe YD 1:37 and Igros Moshe YD 2:27, based on Noda B’Yehuda, Volume 1, YD 26, because something that is completely dry does not have enough taste to make a forbidden meat and milk mixture. See also Mishnas Rebbi Aharon YD 16:7-13, where he seems to give an additional reason. ↩

3. Chullin 114a ↩

4. YD 87:7. See also in Mishnas Rebbi Aharon YD 16,2, where he is unsure if the prohibition is really only Rabbinic, as we had suggested, or if it is indeed Biblical in nature, but one who does so is except from punishment for side reasons. ↩

5. YD 99:1 ↩

6. First opinion in Rama there. ↩

7. YD 87:10 ↩

8. There 33 ↩

9. The Shach has one caveat, however, which is that he says that one should not l’chatchila (initially, in the first place) make such a mixture; however, the Pischei Teshuva (there 19) quotes R. Akiva Eiger, that this is only when there will not be sixty times the prohibition in the mixture to be nullify the stomach. If there will be sixty times the prohibition in the mixture to be nullify the stomach, it should be permitted to rely on the leniency even l’chatchila. ↩

10. Achiezer 3:33:5 ↩

11. He explains that there is no problem of ein mevatlin issur l’chatchila (nullifying a prohibited item in the first place) in this case based on a responsum of R. Akiva Eiger (207). R. Eiger says that if, absent bittul (nullification), there would not be a Biblical prohibition, there is no issue of ein mevatlin issur l’chatchila (nullifying a prohibited item in the first place). ↩

12. Yabia Omer YD 8:11 ↩

13. Melamed l’hoil YD 2:24 ↩

14. The responsum is printed in the introduction to Volume 4 of Tzitz Eliezer. Note that R. Abramsky rejects the logic to permit gelatin based on nishtanu (that it is changed), and permits it only because the bones are dried up. He does not address the fact that there is sixty times the gelatin in the mixture, which could potentially nullify the gelatin. ↩

15. Whenever a Halachic authority mentions something like this, one would need to determine whether the conditions under which he made such a statement would still apply, and whether if he were alive today if he would still say this. In any case, this is well beyond the scope of this article. ↩

16. Mishnas Rebbi Aharon, YD 16-17 ↩

17. Achshvei is when one eats something which is not fit for human consumption; on a Biblical level, there is no prohibition whatsoever but rabbinically there is a prohibition to eat this item because you are showing that it does have importance to you. ↩

18. Igros Moshe YD 2:27, in the last paragraph. R. Moshe Feinstein writes that gelatin from a non-kosher animal is forbidden because the Rambam ruled that bones are forbidden even though there is no punishment for eating them. Surprisingly, R. Feinstein seems to ignore the Rama and Shach mentioned above. However, it is possible (although by no means certain) that he really meant something along the lines of what R. Aharon Kotler said, that they are at least forbidden on the rabbinical level. In any case, it is clear that his position is that gelatin made from bones of non-kosher animals is forbidden. Also note that R. Moshe is lenient when it comes to gelatin made from processed animal skins, see Igros Moshe YD 2:23. ↩

19. Minchas Yitzchak 5:5 ↩

20. Edus L’Yisrael, page 177 ↩

21. Har Tzvi YD 83 ↩

22. Emunas Itecha, Volume 97, page 41 ↩

23. Emunas Itecha, Volume 98, page 143 ↩

24. Emunas Itecha, Volume 99, page 152 ↩

25. On http://www.toraland.org.il/media/273100/emunatTahapuhotZman.pdf, page 16 of the pdf, footnote 73, it is suggested that the argument over whether it is unfit for consumption of a dog might really be a definitional argument. What does it mean for something to be unfit for consumption of a dog–is it that a dog would never eat it, even if it is hungry, or that a domesticated dog would not normally eat it? ↩

26. See http://oukosher.org/blog/industrial-kosher/the-fascinating-story-of-kosher-gelatin-or-how-a-product-from-beef-can-be-used-in-dairy-delicacies/, see also http://www.star-k.org/kashrus/kk-issues-GettingIntoTheThickOfThingsGelatin.htm. ↩

27. According to RJJ Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Volume 30, page 66, footnote 1, the Rabbanut follows the lenient position. However, according to an article on the Kosharot website (http://www.kosharot.co.il/show_hadracha.asp?id=60085), the Rabbanut follows the stringent position, which is contradicted by another article by Kosharot themselves (Emunas Itecha, Volume 99, 152) which claims that only mehadrin kosher supervision follows the stringent opinion. According to an article on the Tzohar website (http://www.tzohar.org.il/?content=%D7%94%D7%92%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%95), the Rabbanut is lenient for “regular” kashrut (as opposed to mehadrin, or higher standard supervision). Also, see the article on the B’chadrei Chareidim forum (http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2024554&forum_id=16810) about someone who sued the Strauss company and the Rabbanut for misleading them into thinking that certain products containing gelatin are kosher; different parts of the article appear to present contradictory positions which the Rabbanut allegedly holds on this matter. Also, see on the Tzomet website (http://zomet.org.il/?CategoryID=258&ArticleID=274&Page=1), where former Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron says that while the Rabbanut does certify gelatin taken from the bones of non-kosher animals, they require it to be labeled as such. ↩

Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik

by R. Aharon Ziegler

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 101:2) states that the individual Shemoneh Esrei may not be recited in one’s heart or mind but must be articulated and verbalized so that one hears it oneself. On the other hand, one must not recite it loud enough for others to hear. The Mishnah Berurah comments (note 7) that HaKadosh Baruch Hu hears even silent prayers.

Although the individual’s Shemoneh Esrei is recited silently, the Chazarat Ha-Shatz (the repetition of the Shemoneh Esrei) is recited aloud. Rav Soloveitchik explained the difference. The individual, no matter how righteous, has no right to claim anything from HaShem. G-d owes the individual nothing. When an individual prays, therefore, he must do so in the context of supplication, as a poor person at someone’s door, begging for a donation. The Shali’ach Tzibbur (Chazan or leader), on the other hand, prays on behalf of the entire congregation. He thus has the right to demand that HaShem fulfill His covenantal obligations. He indeed has the right and the obligation to pray aloud.

When Did Moshe Pass the Mantle of Leadership to Yehoshua? (27:12-23)

by Rav Elchanan Samet

A. Presentation of the problem

(27:12) “And God said to Moshe: Ascend this Mt. Avarim and see the land that I have given to Bnei Yisrael.

(13) You shall see it and [then] you, too, shall be gathered to your people, as Aharon your brother was gathered.

(14) As you rebelled against My command in the wilderness of Tzin, when the nation quarreled – to sanctify Me with the water, before their eyes; these were the waters of dissent of Kadesh in the wilderness of Tzin.”

Among his questions on our parasha, Abarbanel asks:

“The ninth question concerns God telling Moshe, ‘Ascend this Mt. Avarim and see that land,’ concluding with the words, ‘And you, too, shall be gathered to your people AS AHARON YOUR BROTHER WAS GATHERED’ – but Moshe did not die upon receiving this command! Aharon, upon being commanded to die, ascended the mountain and died. Likewise Moshe, in the parasha of Ha’azinu (Devarim 32:48-52, 34:1-5). But here, why does God command him [to ascend Mt. Avarim] if the day of his death has not yet arrived?”

A great distance separates Parashat Pinchas, where we find ourselves, and the parashot of Ha’azinu and Ve-Zot Ha-Berakha, where Moshe is commanded once again to ascend Mt. Avarim to die, and he does so. Admittedly, from a chronological point of view the distance in time is not great – only a few months – but those final months of Moshe’s life were full of momentous events, as attested to by the end of Sefer Bemidbar and all of Sefer Devarim.

It is therefore impossible that at this very early stage, with many very important tasks still awaiting Moshe, that he would be told that his time has come to die, before completing his life’s mission. What, then, is the point of the verses quoted above?

B. “No chronological order in the Torah” – a solution and its rejection

The great similarity Bemidbar 27:12-14 and Devarim 32:48-52 gives the impression that the Torah is describing the same command. This would tempt us to answer that “there is no chronological order in the Torah,” and the command appears here before its designated time. However, this answer is impossible, as we shall see shortly.

Yehoshua’s appointment as Moshe’s successor appears in our narrative as the crux of the story. Moshe requests that God appoint “a man over the congregation, who will go out before them and come before them,” and he makes no mention of any specific person. Only in God’s response to Moshe, introducing the second half of the story, do we find the big news:

(18) “Take for yourself Yehoshua bin Nun, a man of spirit, and place your hand upon him.”

We may conclude that up until this point it is not clear who will succeed Moshe in the leadership role.

Now we ask: where in the Torah is there any clear indication (by Moshe or by God) of Yehoshua as the next leader of Israel? Such indications are found in several places in the Torah, starting in the final parashot of Sefer Bemidbar and continuing through Sefer Devarim (e.g., Bemidbar 32:28-29; 34:16-19; Devarim 1:37-38; 3:21; 31:3; etc.).

If the command to Moshe at the end of parashat Ha’azinu to ascend Mt. Avarim to die there (32:48-52) is the same command given in our parasha, then it is that command that causes Moshe to ask God to appoint him a successor, and only then does God notify him that Yehoshua will be the next leader. But this does not sit well with all the sources in which we discern that Yehoshua was already recognized as Moshe’s successor from the time of the events described at the end of Sefer Bemidbar, even before Moshe launches into his great and final speech.

We must therefore conclude that the command in our parasha is located in its proper chronological place. Moshe’s request that a successor be appointed, and God’s response, revealing Yehoshua as his successor, apparently took place after the census in the plains of Moav (chapter 26) and before the war against Midian (chapter 31). Indeed, nowhere prior to our narrative is there any mention of Yehoshua as Moshe’s successor.

But if this is so, then not only Moshe’s request for a successor appears in its proper place, but also the motive that leads him to request this – the command that he ascend Mt. Avarim and die – appears in its place and at its time, and not in accordance with the principle that “there is no chronological order in the Torah”. This brings us back to Abarbanel’s question: “But Moshe did not die upon receiving this command… Why does God command him if the day of his death has not yet arrived?”

C. Ramban’s solution: an event in the present that is entirely concerned with the future

Whether for the reasons above or out of a fundamental objection to the principle of “no chronological order in the Torah” when not absolutely necessary, the Ramban attempts to explain God’s command to Moshe (as well as the continuation of the story) in keeping with the chronological context. The solution proposed by Ramban for our verses (12-14) is that they were indeed told to Moshe here and now, at the time of the events narrated at the end of Sefer Bemidbar. However, they are not actually a command, “for if they had been, Moshe would have been obliged to ascend [Mt. Avarim] immediately,” but rather a notice concerning the future.

Ramban’s approach solves the difficulties mentioned previously. Without relying on the principle of “no chronological order in the Torah,” Ramban manages to relate God’s words here to His words at the end of parashat Ha’azinu. They are indeed the same words, but they are uttered twice, at different times and for different purposes. In our parasha they are only a notification as to the future, while at the end of parashat Ha’azinu they are uttered as a command that must be fulfilled immediately.

The indication of Yehoshua as Moshe’s future successor similarly appears in our parasha as notification about the future. From now on, Moshe and all of Israel know that Yehoshua will inherit Moshe’s leadership position, even though the actual transfer of power will take place just before Moshe’s death. This, then, is the reason Yehoshua’s appointment as Moshe’s successor is a known fact starting from the final parashot of Sefer Bemidbar.

Thus, Ramban maintains that the dialogue between God and Moshe in our parasha takes place at the time of its location in the text. It follows the census described previously, but this dialogue in its entirety concerns the future. God’s notification to Moshe that he will die on Mt. Avarim, Moshe’s request that a successor be appointed, and God’s response – all of these pertain to the future, when Moshe’s day of death arrives. Why, then, in Ramban’s view, does this dialogue about the future take place at such an early stage? Ramban explains:

“Since God commands him [right before this], ‘To these shall the land be divided’ (26:53), He notifies him, ‘It will not be divided by you, for you will ascend Mt. Avarim… and die there, and will not get to the land, but only see it.’”

Ramban’s explanation for the Torah dealing with the decree of death for Moshe in our narrative, such a long time before his actual day of death, does not solve the issue of why the Torah must also mention Yehoshua here – which, according to Ramban’s own explanation, is also a matter that will become real only in the future. It appears that Ramban was not troubled by this question because he maintained that the discussion regarding Yehoshua’s appointment was a secondary result of the notice about Moshe’s death in the future, rather than the whole reason for this parasha.

This gives rise to another difficulty. The majority of our story (nine out of twelve verses) is devoted to the discussion of Yehoshua’s succession. From the point of view of literary structure and the internal proportion between the various parts of the parasha, we must deduce that the notice of Moshe’s impending death appears to be less central aspect the story. It seems to appear here only as the pretext for Moshe’s subsequent request that a successor be appointed. This is especially true if we accept (unlike the Ramban) that God’s command to Moshe to appoint Yehoshua, and Moshe’s fulfillment of this command, pertain to the actual time when our story takes place, rather than to some time in the future.

D. Abarbanel’s solution: The command that Moshe ascend Mt. Avarim pertains to the present

Abarbanel attempts to interpret the imperative style of God’s words to Moshe in their literal sense, but not as an instruction to Moshe that he go to die upon Mt. Avarim immediately:

“In this utterance, although God commands him to ascend the mountain and see the land, it is not in order that he die there immediately. This [command] is not identical to the narrative at the end of Ha’azinu, and the action described there is not the same as the one described there, as Ramban thought. For this reason it is not written here, ‘And die upon the mountain,’ as it says there. Rather, God commands that he ascend the mountain that is before them – i.e., several times, and view the land from there. For whenever he ascends there, he will lift his eyes to the hills in order to see the land, every day.”

Thus far, Abarbanel has interpreted verse 12, “Ascend this Mt. Avarim and see the land,” which is literally a command, and pertains to this moment in time. He now begins to address verse 13, “You shall see it and you, too, shall be gathered to your people, as Aharon your brother was gathered”:

“When God says now, ‘You shall see it, and you shall be gathered to your people,’ it is to teach that now Moshe will see the land himself, as much as he is able to see, but he will see a different view of it again at the time of his death, as is mentioned there (in parashat Ha’azinu). This is the meaning of, ‘You shall see it’ – i.e., in the future tense [as opposed to the imperative - re'eh - in the previous verse, which refers to the present tense; the 'vav' at the beginning of the word 've-ra'ita' changes the tense from past to future]. Then, ‘you will be gathered to your people’ – at that time, after that final viewing, ‘as Aharon your brother was gathered.’ Thus, Moshe was not commanded that he would die right now, but rather was being told to ascend the mountain regularly and to view the land from there, for his death was not far away. God gives the reason for his being gathered to his people in the wilderness, without entering the land, by stating that it is in accordance with their sin [verse 14].”

Abarbanel interprets all the imperative expressions in our narrative as regular commands pertaining to the immediate situation. Only verse 13 – “You SHALL SEE (ve-ra’ita) and you SHALL BE GATHERED (ve-ne’esafta) to your people” – is treated by him as notification about the future. The verbs in this verse do admittedly allow such an interpretation, for they are future-tense verbs. The transition from verse 12, commanding Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim immediately, to verse 13, notifying him about the final viewing, following which he will be gathered to his people – is likewise exegetically reasonable.

But Abarbanel’s interpretation is not altogether plausible from the thematic perspective. The very idea that God is commanding Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim “several times… for whenever he ascends there he will lift his eyes to the hills in order to see the land, every day” is a new idea that makes no sense. The command to Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim on the day of his death is a command with a purpose: this ascent is meant to make the moment of death easier for him to bear, because he will have feasted his eyes upon the promised land. A further difficulty that arises from Abarbanel’s interpretation is that if God is commanding Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim NOW, where is this command fulfilled? The absence of any description of the fulfillment of the command to ascend Mt. Avarim proves the Ramban’s view, or one similar to it. As the Ramban notes, what Moshe is told in verse 12 “is not a mitzva that the Holy One commands him to fulfill right now, FOR IF THIS WERE THE CASE, HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ASCEND IMMEDIATELY!”

E. A New Suggestion

Our discussion of the possibilities raised by the various commentators allows us now to propose an interpretation that will solve the difficulties we have encountered (while in turn creating new ones).

I propose that God’s words to Moshe in verses 12-14, “Ascend this Mt. Avarim and see the land,” be wholly identified with their parallel at the end of parashat Ha’azinu, as the great similarity between the two sources would seem to suggest. This being so, the appearance of this utterance by God in our parasha is indeed an instance of “there is no chronological order in the Torah” – but the same is not true of the continuation of the story.

At the time where we find ourselves, in the middle of parashat Pinchas, a few months prior to Moshe’s death, these words are not told to Moshe – neither as a command that must be fulfilled immediately (Abarbanel) nor as notification of what will occur in the future (Ramban). These words are destined to be said to Moshe only on the day of his death, as recorded at the end of parashat Ha’azinu. But in parashat Pinchas the Torah gives us this preview, to fill a need not of Moshe’s, but of ours – the readers.

What makes this preview necessary? It is Moshe’s request of God: “Let God appoint… a man over the congregation,” and the ensuing discussion. This request by Moshe comes in the midst of his routine activity as leader of the nation. Therefore, it would hit us like a bolt of lightning, without any psychological preparation on our part and without any introduction in the text, were it not for the Torah’s prior notification that the day of Moshe’s death is drawing near. This also hints that Moshe himself is conscious of this fact.

From a thematic point of view, this interpretation is close to the Ramban’s definition of the function of verses 12-14: as notification of what is destined for Moshe on the day of his death. The difference is that the Ramban sees them as NOTIFICATION BY GOD AS ACTUALLY GIVEN TO MOSHE AT THIS TIME, which forces him to interpret the imperative form of God’s commands as regular future tense. According to my suggestion, verses 12-14 should be regarded as NOTIFICATION BY THE TORAH TO THE READERS OF THE STORY, taking the command in Ha’azinu and introducing it in our parasha, relying on the principle that “there is no chronological order in the Torah.”

If verses 12-14 are not God’s actual speech to Moshe, notifying him of his impending death, what prompts Moshe to request that a successor be named? In general we may answer that his motivation is his awareness that his death is drawing near and that he must take care of the issue of a successor. Moshe needs no reminder of this. He knows that the decree that has been passed upon him (20:12), “You shall not bring this congregation to the land that I have given them,” will be fulfilled. His brother has already died as a result of this decree, just a short while ago, and the nation is already in the final stages of preparation for entering the land. If Moshe does not attend to the appointment of a successor now, when will he do it?

But we, the readers of the Torah, need a reminder of that decree. The multiplicity of events, of which Moshe is always at the center, may lead us to forget that Moshe’s death is drawing near. We may therefore be taken by surprise by his request of God to appoint a successor when he is still functioning at full strength, fulfilling his role as leader with no signs of weakening.

F. The census and Yehoshua’s appointment

This interpretation changes our perception of the crux of the story. Verses 12-14 can no longer be considered the main thrust of the story; they are merely a necessary technical introduction to assist us in understanding the rest. It is the continuation, regarding the appointment of Yehoshua, that is therefore the essence of the story. The fact that these verses represent a technical introduction is borne out by thevery fact that our parasha is not their proper place;they appear here only as a preview.

Because these words were not actually spoken by God to Moshe at this time, we need not ask why God chooses specifically this moment to notify Moshe of his impending death. Likewise, there is no need to find any significance to the juxtaposition of the census, or the discussion of the inheritance of the land, to these verses. Verses 12-14 are not related to what precedes them; rather, they are a necessary preamble to what follows them.

The question we must ask is a different one: why does Moshe ask of God to appoint a new leader specifically at this time? According to the literal text, it would seem that the motivation for his request right now is the preceding census. Moshe knows that this was his census of farewell from the nation, and the population that he counted must now be entrusted to a new leader. This leads him to ask God to appoint such a person.

The root “p-k-d” appears twenty times in chapter 26. Let us review the concluding verses of this census (mifkad) together with Moshe’s request and God’s response to it:

(26:63) “These are the people numbered (pekudei) by Moshe and Elazar the kohen, who counted (pakdu) Bnei Yisrael in the plains of Moav at the Jordan, near Yericho.

(64) But among these there was not a single man of those counted (pekudei) by Moshe and Aharon and kohen, who counted (pakdu) Bnei Yisrael in the wilderness of Sinai.

(65) For God had told them: They shall surely die in the wilderness. And not a single man remained of them, except for Kalev ben Yefuneh and YEHOSHUA BIN NUN…

(27:16-17) “Let God, Lord of the spirits of all flesh, appoint (yifkod) a man over the congregation… that God’s congregation not be like sheep that have no shepherd.

(18) And God said to Moshe: Take for yourself YEHOSHUA BIN NUN…”

The concluding verses of the census themselves indicate that this is Moshe’s farewell census. These verses contrast the two censuses that frame Sefer Bemidbar: the census conducted in the wilderness of Sinai in the second year, and the present census, conducted in the plains of Moav in the fortieth year. The first census was conducted by Moshe and Aharon – the leaders of the generation that left Egypt. The present census is carried out by Moshe and Elazar the kohen. Those originally counted have all been replaced – “not a single man remained of them.” Even Aharon himself has been replaced by his son, Elazar. Only Moshe remains as the tangible link between the two censuses. But it is nevertheless clear from this census that Moshe is not the natural leader of the new generation.

Who, then, will be the leader of this generation? The answer is hinted at quite dramatically in the fact that the larger literary unit describing the census – sixty-five verses in length – concludes, surprisingly, with the name of Yehoshua bin Nun, seemingly quite unnecessarily. This conclusion hints that it is Yehoshua who will be entrusted with the leadership of these people.

Let us now turn to Moshe’s request of God, opening with the word “yifkod” (“Let [God] appoint…”). The meaning of the word here is “appoint” and not “count,” but it is certainly no coincidence that both the root “p-k-d” and the root “m-n-h” are related both to leadership and to counting. It appears that there is a fundamental connection between these two actions: the leader is one who counts his nation; the “mefaked” (leader, commander) counts (poked); the “memuneh” (appointed one) numbers (moneh).

Likewise, Moshe’s words further on – “that God’s congregation not be LIKE SHEEP THAT HAVE NO SHEPHERD” – appear to have their source in the census that has just been completed. Counting the sheep is one of the regular tasks of the shepherd as he ends his day’s work and returns the flock to the owner. Similarly, Moshe – the faithful shepherd – counts his flock before taking leave of them, and therefore he is concerned that that flock not be left without a shepherd.

Following all of this we come to God’s response to Moshe, revealing the name of the next leader who will guide the flock: Yehoshua bin Nun, whose name concluded chapter 26 – the chapter recounting the census of Bnei Yisrael.

This essay originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with permission.

▪ Hilchot Siren During Tefillah
▪ Interesting thoughts from a Christian perspective: It Takes More Than a Swank Coffee Shop to Reach Millennials
▪ NY Orthodox rabbi’s got his congregation on the rails
▪ The First—and Last—Time I Wore Tefillin
▪ New app aims to deliver instant minyan
▪ Rabbis stand up for ethics: Rabbonim, Lakewood Poskim, sign letter in response to practice of abusing promotional credit card offers
▪ 64 US Jews make aliyah despite escalating security situation

by R. Daniel Mann

Question: I am often overjoyed that Hashem granted me the zechut to live in Israel for many years, causing me to make a “spontaneous” beracha. A friend told me it is forbidden to compose my own berachot, as one can only use those Chazal composed.Is Judaism not all about thanking Hashem for all the wonders of creations and providence? Would I be precluded from thanking Hashem for something important to me?

Answer: Your assumption that one’s relationship with Hashem should be personal and overflowing is poignantly and refreshingly correct. On the other hand, one does not have free reign to serve Hashem as he desires, as evident from such halachot as bal tosif (not adding on to the mitzvot) and beracha l’vatala (unwarranted beracha). Let us seek perspective and guidelines.

The gemara (Berachot 33a) says that one who fulfilled a beracha requirement and then made an unnecessary one violated the prohibition of saying Hashem’s Name in vain. Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33a) argues that uttering Hashem’s Name to praise Him cannot be in vain, but that it is a Rabbinic prohibition that “leans” on the pasuk. The Rambam (Berachot 1:15) seems to hold that beracha l’vatala is a Torah prohibition (Magen Avraham 215:6).

All agree that uttering Hashem’s Name without any purpose is an isur aseh (low-level Torah prohibition – Temura 4a). Yet, using Hashem’s Name in the context of praising Him is positive and permitted. In fact, the Rambam (Shvuot 12:11) says that if one mistakenly uttered the Name, he should immediately turn it into an appropriate praise of Hashem, and one of his suggested texts of spontaneous praise begins with “baruch.”

Where do we draw the line between appropriate praise and a beracha l’vatala? One approach is that the crucial factor is intention and context. If one intends to recite a required beracha when he is actually not required or if a mistake disqualifies the beracha, it is a beracha l’vatala. If the same words are said as an expression of personal gratitude, it is permitted (Chavat Da’at 110, Beit Hasafek 20; see Minchat Shlomo II:3). The Chavat Da’at cites a precedent for the distinction: one is allowed to repeat Shemoneh Esrei (which is comprised of berachot)with the intention it is voluntary, but not with an intention for an obligation (see Rosh, Berachot 3:15).

Others distinguish based on the text used, which is most severe when one utters a classic name of Hashem. Some say that if one recites the beracha in a language other than Hebrew so that the Name is equivalent only to a kinuy (a descriptive reference) of Hashem, it has the benefits of a beracha without the fear of beracha l’vatala (see opinions cited in Shut R. Akiva Eiger I:25, Pitchei Teshuva, YD 328:1, Piskei Teshuvot 209:7). R. Akiva Eiger (ibid.) and the Netziv (Ha’amek She’ala 53:2) argue that in the recognized, sensitive context of a beracha, even a kinuy or foreign language Name can be forbidden, as we find regarding an oath. The Netziv says that the problem is a Rabbinic issue of appearing to recite a beracha l’vatala. Therefore, the closer the text (and/or the context) is to that of a beracha, the more likely it is to be forbidden. The Minchat Shlomo (ibid.) explains that one should not act in a way that challenges the rules the Rabbis set. However, those rules were not set to forbid expression of personal thanks to Hashem.

We summarize as follows. Your desire to praise Hashem is commendable. Paradoxically, the more creative the text and style are, the clearer it is that it is permitted. Convention is that an individual should generally refrain from using Hashem’s main Names, which we leave primarily to Chazal and to great rabbis who have composed prayers and praises throughout history. Saying “Hashem,” “Hakadosh Baruch Hu,” “Ribbono Shel Olam,” or a Name not in Hebrew is safer and as profound. It is at least preferable not to recite anything that resembles a beracha of Chazal by content, by context (e.g., in Birkot Hashachar) and/or by regularity. That still leaves you with room for much self-expression.

by R. Gidon Rothstein

If Ran has convinced us that we need to focus on the religious as well as the physical in hoping to avoid calamity, we need a better understanding of the main method of healing religious ills, teshuvah, repentance.  Much of the sixth drasha exhorts, encourages, and reassures his listeners that they can in fact take advantage of this gift from Hashem, implying that they weren’t so sure.

It Should Have Been Hard, But It’s Not

The drasha starts with verses that draw our attention to how surprising it is that Hashem allows us to get away with repentance. Really, Michah says (6:6), it should be impossible to make up for violating Hashem’s will. What should, by rights, mollify the Creator, Who gave us life out of pure kindness, and Whose commands we willfully violate?

To our good fortune, Hashem decided to forego His rights, as it were, and accept repentance. Teshuvah dispenses with compensation in favor of regret and re-commitment. While this may sound simple, experience shows that it’s not.

The Downside to How Easy Hashem Made It

The ease of repentance benefits those who avail themselves of it. However, this very unearned ease heightens the wrongs of those who fail to repent. Had repentance in fact involved onerous efforts at rectification, we would have had a bit of an excuse–that it is just too hard.

To Ran, that’s why Michah 6:10 says that the righteous will succeed in the ways of Hashem and the wicked will stumble. The very ease of walking in Hashem’s ways is itself the stumbling block. If it were hard, failure would be understandable. But it’s so easy!

Making it even easier is Hashem’s helping us return in other ways, such as by bringing calamities on people far away. Seeing them suffer should remind us that we could easily deserve a similar fate, spurring repentance.

I have seen that passage read as Ran saying that Hashem brings disasters upon those others to teach us a lesson.  As if the Merciful One would cause needless suffering just to call us to repentance! That mistaken reading misses that Ran never says the people affected didn’t also sin.

Ran’s next sentence says that if we fail to change, those same calamities will reach us (which supports my Black Death theory, since that didn’t start in Spain). He’s saying that the favor is that Hashem starts with those others even though we were equally deserving of what befell them.

The favor is in Hashem giving us more time than we deserve, starting His collection of spiritual overdrafts with others. We are expected to use what happens to them as a reminder to put our own accounts in order before Hashem comes to discuss our delinquencies.

You Don’t Have To Be Great to Repent, But It Helps

One worry his listeners seem to have had was that perhaps only those with great wisdom and perfect knowledge of Torah can successfully repent. Ran agrees that study of Torah earns great reward. However, he argues, Berachot 20a—which wonders why miracles happened for generations that had much less Torah knowledge than others– asserts that Hashem “cares” most about our sincerity.

Ran is striking a balance. While not denying the importance of Torah study, he stays firm on the idea that a sincere interest in penitence and return to Hashem will also accomplish a great deal.

The Repentance Doesn’t Have to be Great, But It Helps

Ran’s listeners were also troubled by Yoma’s saying that a “real” penitent faces temptation once, twice, and three times, in similar circumstances, and resists.  They took that to mean that those who only repent when they’re older, when many of the urges to sin have quieted, cannot achieve “real” repentance.

Rambam addressed this, too, distinguishing among levels of completeness in one’s repentance, without quantifying the difference. Ran advances the theory that base-level repentance atones, assuaging the “anger” that is the appropriate response to our sin.  More perfect repentance converts sins into merits, as Yoma 86b notes. For that, we need to face and resist the exact same temptation.  [Ran doesn’t explain, here, why it would be that such repentance creates merits, and I don’t have the space to speculate.]

Ran reminds us of the indispensability of sincerity for even that lower level of repentance. One marker of sincerity is that we do not stop with the particular sin we’ve noticed, admit it, hope not to repeat it, and leave it at that. Sincerity would lead us to examine all our actions, looking for other ways in which we’re imperfect. We would let all of our imperfections sit in our awareness, as Tehillim 51:5 says, “for I know my iniquity, and my sins are before me always.” They would serve as constant fuel for avoiding recidivism and opting for improvement.  That’s sincerity.

The Power of Sincerity

This back and forth shows the difficulty Ran faced.  He wanted to show his listeners how much easier repentance is than it could by rights have been, without glossing over how far they needed to go to qualify as sincere and wholehearted.

One last encouragement Ran offers is that proper repentance can avert the worst of decrees, on an individual or communal level. Hashem’s righteous wrath over biblical sins were all mitigated with sincere repentance. These biblical examples include King David’s sin with Batsheva which, as Ran notes, Scripture portrays as an adulterous affair to show that whatever the sin was, it was as serious a sin for a man of David’s stature as actual adultery would be for one of us; Nineveh’s sins, which were bad enough to deserve annihilation; and even Nevuchadnezzar’s evils,

The implication is that even the Black Death could yield, if Ran’s audience repented sincerely enough.  A challenging claim for them, clearly, as it would be for us if we, God forbid, faced another such plague.

Let’s be thankful that we don’t, and hope we can absorb Ran’s lessons before we ever do.

▪ Grappling With the Rising Cost of Being an Orthodox Jew
▪ It can’t be used in a shul but is an important step forward in robot’s rights: Robot writes Torah in Berlin museum
▪ In Brooklyn, a Trove of Hebrew Books From Centuries Past
▪ That there was even a question shows the pernicious influence of tabloids misrepresenting the story: Canadian mohel cleared in ‘metzitzah b’peh’ case

In previous articles we dealt with the halachos of dangerous activities, such as eating fish together with meat, talking with food in your mouth, learning the halachos of avielus, and going for blood tests on Erev Yom Tov. In addition, we have dealt with placing food under the bed, leaving eggs peeled overnight, and the will of Rav Yehuda Hachasid which all involve some form of danger.

In this article, we will focus on other halachos. For example, is one allowed to place himself in a potentially dangerous situation, such as attending a Yeshiva in Eretz Yisroel in a time of war? May one visit dangerous places? Is it permitted to join the army? Kashrus professionals frequently go to remote countries to supervise kosher production. Is this permitted in spite of a potential danger? This topic is especially relevant in the summer months when people like to vacation to remote locations. All these and other areas of danger will be discussed below.

Introduction

A person has a mitzvah to remove himself from danger.¹ Many poskim say that this is a mitzvah d’oraisa,² while other poskim say it is a d’rabbonon.³ The Chinuch⁴ explains that Hashem gave us a nefesh which resides within the body, and one must protect his body in order to protect the nefesh. The Be’er Hagolah⁵ says that Hashem created the world with kindness for the purpose of doing good to His creations. One who puts himself in danger is implying that he does not want the good that Hashem gave him. There is no greater apikores than such a person. The Mesillas Yeshorim⁶ writes that one who does not treat his body with the appropriate respect is a shotah. The Sefer Chassidim⁷ says that one who places himself in a dangerous situation will have to give a din and cheshbon to Hashem why he did so. The Ritvah⁸ says that one should not eat any unhealthy food. Many people will scrupulously avoid an issur, and Chazal tell us that something that involves danger is more severe than an issur.⁹ Whoever does dangerous things to himself and destroys himself has no olom haba.¹⁰ A person may not say, “I will go to a dangerous place or do something dangerous and a miracle will happen,” because maybe a miracle will not happen to him.¹¹ Although many dangers mentioned in Shas are not brought in halacha, the Stiepler zt”l was careful with all of them.¹²

“Hashem Watches the Fools”

In many places, the Gemorah¹³ permits a dangerous action on the grounds that it is done by many people, and it is included in “shomer pisayim Hashem”¹⁴ – Hashem watches the fools.” There are many restrictions to this idea, as will be discussed below.

The simple meaning is that one is permitted to do a dangerous act, since Hashem watches the fools. However, this only applies to a common act which is not considered dangerous.¹⁵ The Achiezer¹⁶ maintains that this idea was used in a unique case and cannot be applied to other cases.¹⁷ The Binyon Tzion¹⁸ has a different approach. He says that if one is already in danger he has to do whatever is possible to remove himself from the danger. However, if the danger is not yet at hand and there is less than a fifty percent chance that the action will result in a dangerous situation, then the specific action is permitted. This is where we apply shomer pisayim Hashem.

Some only apply this idea where there is doubt if the action is dangerous at all.¹⁹ Others limit this idea to someone who is not a learned person (am ha’aretz).²⁰

“One Who Keeps a Mitzvah Will Know no Evil”

Another common phrase used to permit a dangerous act is that, “One who keeps a mitzvah will know no evil.” However, the poskim discuss many variables as to when this applies.²¹

“When One is Doing a Mitzvah He Will Not be Hurt”

The Gemorah²² permits bedikas chometz in a snake-infested area because, “When one is doing a Mitzvah he will not be hurt.” However, this only applies if the possible danger is not a frequent occurrence. The Gemorah²³ says that when one learns Torah lishma he is protected from even dangers that are common, even when he is not learning.

For One’s Livelihood

The Gemorah²⁴ records that workers would risk their lives in order to make a living. The Nodeh B’Yehuda²⁵ permits hunting for one’s livelihood, even if it is a danger. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l²⁶ also permits possibly dangerous activities for a livelihood. However, one should consult with his Rav before going into business which can involve danger, since there are no clear cut rules for this matter.

Living in a Dangerous Place

There is no question that the thousands of people who live in Eretz Yisroel face the danger of terrorism. We will not arrive at a ruling as to whether one should live in Eretz Yisroel. Rather, we will discuss the issues involving the exposure to danger.

Klal Yisroel was given the Torah “to live with (mitzvos)” not to r”l die from them. This is expressed in the words of v’chai bahem.²⁷

We all know that when there is a matter of life and death, one is permitted to even desecrate Shabbos and Yom Kippur, and is only obligated to give up his life in order to avoid Avodah Zarah, illicit behavior, and murder.²⁸

Some are of the opinion that living in Eretz Yisroel is of such great importance that one may live there even if he is in danger.²⁹ This is because the mitzvah applies to the masses and not to the individual.³⁰ In addition, it is a mitzvah to help fight a war, even if it is dangerous. The admonition of v’chai bahem does not apply to wartime.

Furthermore, these people are not in a constant state of danger. In addition, those who live in remote locations serve to secure the borders, making sure that the Arabs do not take it over. In this way, they are comparable to soldiers of the Israeli army. Based on the above, those who have the courage and strength to live in such places (Shomron, etc.) have on whom to rely on to do so.³¹

A more complicated issue arises when a student is learning in Eretz Yisroel and a war breaks out, and his parents demand that he come home. Is the child required to return home? Although there is a mitzvah to obey one’s parents, one need not follow an order to nullify a mitzvah.³² However, some say that living in Eretz Yisroel is not an active mitzvah for each individual person, but one who lives there fulfills a mitzvah.³³ Others treat this like any other mitzvah, and the child is not obligated to obey his parents’ demand that he return home.³⁴

There is another factor that affects this issue.

There is a dispute among the poskim if the mitzvah of obeying parents applies when the request is not for something which would directly benefit the parent. The consensus is that the mitzvah does not apply. Therefore, if the request is solely motivated by the parents’ concern for the safety of their child, there is no obligation to obey. However, if the request is due to the parents’ own peace of mind, then one is permitted to leave Eretz Yisroel. In the final analysis, one who does not feel he is in grave danger and wishes to stay in Eretz Yisroel may do so, but he may leave if this will contribute to his parents’ peace of mind.³⁵

A Sofek Danger to Save From a Definite Danger

Although a soldier in the Israeli army is definitely exposed to danger, he/she is still permitted to join the army, as will be explained.

A person may expose himself to a sofek danger under certain circumstances in order to save someone from a definite danger, since there is a doubt whether he will ever be exposed to danger.³⁶ This contributes to society, as people will be saved from dangerous situations.³⁷

Therefore, one is obligated to make an effort to save others from a dangerous situation, even if there is a possibility of personal danger. If he fails to do so, he has transgressed the mitzvah of לא תעמוד על דם רעך.³⁸

However, some argue that there is no obligation if it entails even a sofek danger.³⁹

In a case of war, the halacha changes. A war is a threat to the tzibbur, and the soldiers represent the tzibur. Therefore, the soldiers can save other Jews who are in danger even if there is a concern that the soldiers will r”l get killed.⁴⁰

Kashrus Professionals

Many times a kashrus agency may be requested to give a hashgacha in remote countries. If the place is known to be dangerous, one should not visit or send mashgichim there. Each kashrus agency should decide which countries should be avoided.

The United States Department of State provides a list of dangerous countries: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, North Korea, New Guinea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.⁴¹ Certainly, Jews should avoid these countries.

Placing Money in One’s Mouth

The halacha is that one should refrain from placing money in his mouth for fear of contracting a disease,⁴² as people are always touching money, and may transfer microbes to the money.⁴³ Others explain that one may inadvertently swallow the money and choke on the coins.⁴⁴ Based on this, one should be careful not to place small items in his mouth.⁴⁵ Special care should be exercised with little children, as they are accustomed to place money in their mouths.

Other Activities to Avoid

One should not walk under a shaky bridge, near a shaky wall,⁴⁶ or enter a ruin because of danger.⁴⁷ One should not take chewed food out of his mouth and then chew the food again.⁴⁸

Non-Jewish Barber

There is a little known halacha that one is not allowed to take a haircut by a non-Jew, as he might take the razor⁴⁹ and use it to r”l murder the client. However, it is permitted if other people are present,⁵⁰ or if there is a mirror and you can see what he is doing.⁵¹

Some add that since we are accustomed to pay the barber for his services, we are not concerned that he will jeopardize his livelihood by harming his clients.⁵²

Based on kabbalah, some say that one should not take a haircut from a non-Jew,⁵³ especially if there are Jews who are just as capable of giving a haircut.⁵⁴

Loud Music at Weddings

There is a widespread problem of excessively loud music at weddings. Often, the decibel level is sufficient to damage hearing permanently. It is common practice in Eretz Yisroel to utilize a sound meter which automatically shuts off the amplifier when the music reaches a dangerous level. This is a great idea for us to develop as well.
~~~

1. Meseches Berochos 32b, Rambam Hilchos Rotzeach V’shemiras Hanefesh 11:4-5, Sefer Sharei Teshuva 3:82, Shulchan Aruch C.M. 427:8, Levush C.M. 116:57, Ben Ish Chai Pinchus 2:10, Chochmas Adom 68:4, Shulchan Aruch Harav Shemiras Haguf 4, Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 116:1, Pela Yoetz Shemirah:pages 577-579 (new), Kovetz Igeres (Chazzon Ish) 1:136:page 140, Shevet Ha’Levi 6:111:1. ↩

2. Based on the posuk in Devarim 4:9. Refer to Levush C.M. 116:57, Pri Megadim M.Z. 84:2, Tevuas Shor 13:2, Shulchan Hatohar C.M. 427:9, Aruch Hashulchan C.M. 427:8, Bais Yehuda Y.D. 25, Shem Aryeh Y.D. 27, see Yabea Omer Y.D. 1:8:4, Al Pi Hatorah (Shemos) page 343, see Pe’er Tachas Eifer pages 61-68 in great depth. ↩

3. Be’er Hagolah C.M. 427:70, Chinuch mitzvah 546, Chai Adom 16:24, Divrei Malkiel 4:62, see Levush Y.D. 116:1, Me’am Loez Devarim pages 1:232-240. The Betzel Hachuchma 4:118 differentiates between what type of danger it is. ↩

4. Mitzvah 73. ↩

5. C.M. 427:10. ↩

6. 11:page 58. ↩

7. 675. ↩

8. Meseches Shavuos 27a.  ↩

9. Meseches Chullin 10a, Rama Y.D. 116:5, see Shulchan Aruch 173:2, Imrei Eish Y.D. 60, Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh page 63, Chaim L’lo Ishan pages 74-76. ↩

10. Meseches Gittin 57b. ↩

11. Meseches Shabbos 32b. ↩

12. Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh 265:page 756. ↩

13. Meseches Shabbos 129b, Yevamos 12b, 72a, Kesubos 39a. ↩

14. Tehillim 116:6. ↩

15. Refer to Rav Akiva Eiger 1:71-72, Pischei Teshuva E.H. 23:2, see Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 33:page 59. ↩

16. E.H. 1:23. Refer to Igros Moshe C.M. 2:76, Tzitz Eliezer 10:25:17, 15:37:2.  ↩

17. Some say the above phrase only applies to the cases where this phrase is brought in the Gemorah (Pe’er Tachas Eifer page 77:footnote 1).  ↩

18. 137. ↩

19. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh pages 66-67, Yabea Omer Y.D 3:7:3. See Igros Moshe C.M. 2:76. ↩

20. Terumas Hadeshen 211. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh page 67. See Yabea Omer Y.D. 2:7. ↩

21. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh pages 69-74 in great depth. ↩

22. Pesachim 8a-8b. Refer to Meseches Kiddushin 39b, Pri Megadim O.C. M.Z. 433:7.  ↩

23. Sotah 21a. Refer to Avnei Nezer O.C. 454:2. ↩

24. Meseches Bava Metziah 112a. ↩

25. Y.D. 2:10. ↩

26. C.M. 1:104. Refer to Halichos Journal 5755:pages 64-67 in great depth.  ↩

27. Vayikra 18:5. Refer to Meseches Yoma 85b.  ↩

28. Refer to Techumin 22:page 117, see Techumin 2:page 187.  ↩

29. Refer to Tosfas Meseches Avodah Zarah 110 “hu” who argues.  ↩

30. Refer to Techumin 27:page 117.  ↩

31. Techumin 22:pages 116-119 in depth.  ↩

32. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 240:15.  ↩

33. Refer to Igros Moshe E.H. 1:102, Y.D. 3:122, see Yechaveh Da’as 3:69, 5:57, Tzitz Eliezer 6:32, 10:32, Minchas Yitzchok 10:108, Minchas Shlomo 2-3:100. ↩

34. Yechaveh Da’as 4:49 in great depth who brings the opinions on this issue.  ↩

35. Refer to Techumin 12:pages 187-199 in great depth.  ↩

36. Bais Yosef C.M. 426.  ↩

37. Chinuch Mitzvah 237.  ↩

38. Shulchan Aruch C.M. 426:1, see Vayikra 19:16. Refer to Sreidim (Journal) 13:pages 51-52.  ↩

39. Refer to Sreidim (Journal) 13:page 52.  ↩

40. Tzitz Eliezer 12:57, 13:100. Refer to Sreidim (Journal) 13:pages 51-60 in great depth. See Yabea Omer C.M. 10:6. This is related to the story of Mordechai and Esther in Megillas Esther as well (see Yabea Omer C.M. 10:6).  ↩

41. Refer to http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html.  ↩

42. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 116:5.  ↩

43. Shach 3, Chochmas Adom 68:2.  ↩

44. Kaf Hachaim 116:38, Chelkes Binyomin 116:34.  ↩

45. Ibid.  ↩

46. Meseches Tannis 20b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 116:5, Shach 5, Chochmas Adom 68:4.  ↩

47. Shach 5.  ↩

48. Kaf Hachaim 116:76.  ↩

49. We are not concerned about him using a scissor since it is not common to do damage with it (Taz 1). Some say if the barber uses a scissor then other people still have to be present to permit taking a haircut form a non-Jew (Be’er Heitiv 156:1).  ↩

50. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 156:1.  ↩

51. Rama Y.D. 156:1. Some say if it is an important person there is no need for him to look in the mirror (Darchei Teshuva 156:1).  ↩

52. Bais Lechem Yehuda Y.D. 156. Refer to Shach 2.  ↩

53. Opinion brought in the Darchei Teshuva 156:4.  ↩

54. Ibid.  ↩

Guardian of Israel, guard the remnant of Israel, and not let Israel perish, who declare, “Listen, Israel” (morning prayers, Sacks translation)

Obviously, news about security and life is dominating our thoughts at this time. I will let those better suited to providing links about that take the lead. The following is additional news:
▪ Anti-Israel protesters besiege Paris synagogue
▪ Some Jewish Thoughts on Understanding Hobby Lobby: Religious Freedom Did Not Really Win or Lose
▪ Atheists Demand Removal of Miami Beach Eruv

Rethinking the Shidduch Crisis: The Role of Jewish Women in Contemporary Society

by Efraim Vaynman

Part 1 of 3

Sometimes we don’t see the obvious until we are forced to. The so-called “Shidduch Crisis,” the many singles struggling to find a mate, is a case-in-point. The Chareidi community in particular has proposed many ideas for solving and alleviating the shidduch crisis such as: financial incentives for setting up older girls, having boys get married earlier, and even having girls start kindergarten later.¹ Much thought has been given to the source of the problem, whether the supposed “age gap theory”² or the Western courtship conventions we’ve adopted. However, not much thought has been given to the more fundamental question of what we are looking for in a marriage. But soon the Chareidi world will be forced to confront this question too.

The Financial Situation and its Effects on Kollel Life

The Chareidi world is facing tumultuous times. Recent budget cuts by the Israeli government to Yeshiva funding and welfare programs are causing upheaval as Chareidi leaders scramble to arrange alternate funding to support their schools and to continue paying the meager stipends to their kollel students. Meanwhile, their American counterparts, while not facing nearly as dire a situation, are also struggling to continue to support the ever-expanding kollel system. As more and more yeshiva students marry and join the ranks of those who make torasam umanusam, studying Torah their occupation, the philanthropic supporters of these yeshivas and kollelim are spread increasingly thin. Affluent grandparents and parents who were once proud and happy to support the kollel lifestyle they never had are now pressed hard to come up with the requisite funds to support their many children and grandchildren who almost all choose to live the ideal Chareidi life of kollel and klei kodesh, inadequately paid communal workers.

The unsustainability of such a community is obvious and many have already written about it. Slowly but surely, in both the Israeli and American Chareidi societies, people are realizing that not everybody will be able to live a kollel life. While this realization is starting to sink in, there are few individuals who are willing to accept they will be the unfortunate ones who will have to live the bedieved life of working for a living.

The question is when these individuals come to this realization. Among men, this often happens when they arrive at the recognition that they are not successful in their learning. Realizing that the limited funding should go to the best scholars, they wistfully consign themselves to their fate and join training programs that will enable them to earn a living. With a yeshiva quota system set to be implemented in Israel in the coming years, this realization will come earlier for these men as they are forcefully removed from the beis medrash.

But what of the women? When do they reluctantly accept that they will not be able live the ideal Torah lifestyle? After all, they too are taught to want,³ or rather demand, that their husbands learn as long as they possibly can.

For a married woman it would seem that her decision to leave full-time learning is reached together with her husband. A wife can encourage her husband to continue learning and offer to financially support the family the best she can. However, many times a woman may come to the realization that despite her best efforts, she is unable to make ends meet or continue doing so while still tending to her responsibilities at home and to her children. For single women this unfortunately seems to often happen after a prolonged unsuccessful dating period in which they were not able to become engaged to a ben torah. Facing the prospect of becoming an “older single,” they accept their fate and start dating men who will not be long-term learners.

Impending Changes

The tides of change have already started to blow, and the situation is on course to dramatically transform in the coming years. The future realities will compel changes to the Chareidi system of kollel, whether the Chareidim like it or not. Kollel will not disappear but it will be reserved for the best and the brightest. People will eventually realize early on whether they are learners or earners, and will prepare for their future according to their own self-determination.

One often overlooked repercussion of this change is its impact this on the Chareidi shidduch model. With more men deciding that they will not be learning long-term there needs to be a commensurate number of women willing to forgo the ideal kollel lifestyle. While it will be apparent which men will be learning, it is not at all known which women will become kollel wives. The discrepancy in age at which men and women realize their fate is already a big contributor to the shidduch crisis, and without some type of change it will be felt more acutely in the coming years. This difference in the amount of men planning on learning and women that plan on being being kollel wives has the potential to exacerbate the shidduch crisis. Signs of the impending crisis are already emerging and according to a recent Mishpacha article, the situation in the Chareidi world has been heightened from an “orange light” to a “red alert”.⁴

In addition, in recent times there has been much material published in which working for living is legitimized. Such material, together with the growing movement of the so called Blue Shirt Charedim (also called Chardashim, short for Chareidim Chadashim, New Chareidim), are helping young yeshiva students realize that not everyone is cut out for a life of full time learning. Although working for a living is being legitimized and becoming socially more acceptable, the ideal still remains to live a kollel life if pragmatically possible.

An Exacerbated Chareidi Shidduch Crisis

The changing attitude to kollel is predominantly occurring among Chareidi men. They still cling to the ideal of kollel life, but acknowledge work as a legitimate undertaking and an appropriate role for some people. What sets the kollel elite apart from others is their blessing of a mind better attuned for learning and the zitzfleish, the stamina and diligence, to continue enthusiastically learning long term.

Because there is no corresponding development among women, this emerging trend threatens to further aggravate the shidduch problem. For the average shidduch-aged girl, there are not many reasons for her to believe that she is different from her friends who will lead a kollel life. Although there are women who feel they are not ready be both a full-time breadwinner and mother, for Chareidi women this is an acknowledgment of weakness of character and self-motivation. There are far fewer women willing to admit this than there are Chareidi men who are willing to acknowledge that there are other men whose mental capabilities make them more successful at learning.

The chasm between men’s and women’s willingness to compromise on living a kollel lifestyle lies not just at the root of the shidduch crisis, but is also the source of a much more profound problem.
As stated earlier, women tend to be willing to compromise on their ideals as they age and start to face a much more gloomy perspective. Naturally, they will at first only compromise on what they see as the least important things and will progressively concede to more compromises as they sense their shidduch chances wane. The point at which a woman will be willing to forgo a kollel lifestyle and what compromises she will be willing to make to attain this lifestyle is our interest here.

There is a pivotal difference between the way men and women accept their inauspicious fate of not living a kollel lifestyle. When a man reaches the conclusion that he should leave yeshiva and join the workforce, he accepts it as the divine will. There are learners and there are earners in Klal Yisroel, and God has decided that the best way for this individual to contribute to the nation is through working and supporting Torah, and learning Torah himself when he can. He finds comfort in knowing that he is more fit for earning and can be more productive that way than had another person learning been forced into his fate.

For a woman, the realization that she must compromise her ideals and marry someone who will not be learning does not naturally lead to the acceptance of her predestined role. After all, until now she was fully prepared to commit to a self-sacrificing life for the sake of her husband’s and children’s Torah. What then happened? She was as willing to make the same sacrifice as her peers who successfully married into kollel life. Why is she different? Although it is possible accept that somehow her peers are more apt or more righteous and deserving than she, this is not an intuitive and comforting answer.

The consequence of this thinking is that a woman is less willing to accept a secondary role of forgoing kollel life. She will prefer to compromise on other things first.

The compromises in choosing a marriage partner that some women are willing to make in order to live a kollel life are cause for more concern than the current shidduch crisis. Is it indeed correct to compromise on a husband’s other qualities for this sake? How much can be compromised without endangering a marriage? Assuming that living a kollel life is of paramount importance, it would seem that it would indeed supersede some other aspects of marital compatibility. I believe that such thinking is dangerous and can potentially lead to marital disasters.

A Return to the Sources

In the following essay I will review the Talmudic sources on which the Chareidi education system bases itself to teach its daughters to want a kollel lifestyle. Through close examination and analysis of the sources I will argue that the applicability of these texts to present day society seems inappropriate.

To be continued… Next installment scheduled for the morning of Wednesday, July 16.
 
 

1. “Closing the Age gap on Shidduchim goes back to Kindergarten” from The Partial View. ↩

2. For a mathematical explanation of this theory see, Ariel Halpert, “All In The Numbers: A Mathematical Explanation For The ‘Shidduch Crisis’”, Jewish Press, Jan 23 2008. ↩

3. This is also true in right wing Modern Orthodox circles as well and is similarly causing its own shidduch crisis. See Harry Maryles’s post A Working Husband? God Forbid!. ↩

4. Issue 472, “From the First Date to the Broken Plate” by Yisroel Besser. ↩

▪ Do we need to start bringing baseball bats to pro-Israel marches to defend ourselves or will the police do their job?: Homeland Security officials discuss protest violence with Jewish leaders
▪ Is the message of the day that we should we be communicating less or better?: ‘Social media ceasefire’ for 17th of Tammuz sparks debate
▪ Rabbis send message to parents of slain Arab boy (Hebrew)
▪ Orthodox Jews run ambulance service of their own
▪ Bnei Akiva Chief Escapes Ouster for ‘Revenge’ Call
▪ All in the family?

by Joel Rich

From The Rav – I’m writing this on the day of the levaya of the 3 kedoshim, I hope I remember the pain and the message by the time this is posted

“Man should not ask: Why evil? He should rather raise the question: What am I supposed to do if confronted with evil; how should I behave vis-a-vis evil? … Suffering, in the opinion of Judaism, must not be purposeless or wasted.”

Does your Shul allow women to say kaddish? If so, does it require a man be saying it as well?
~~~

• Rabbi Azarya Berzon -Hostages taken by terrorists: Do we send in our forces & endanger their lives?

  Some of the basics:
  - Putting oneself in possible danger for someone in definite danger – is it required, allowed or prohibited?
  - Does terrorism qualify for hilchot milchama (rules of war)?
  - Rav Kook on the power of the king and when it reverts to the people
  - Redeeming captives – (FWIW this is worth an extensive shiur on its own – e.g. what type of captives was the Talmud considering?)
  Chazon Ish on diverting the arrow (are we all consequentialists?)

• Rabbi Reisman- Parshas Shelach- Dumb Aveiros

  Foolish sins and some solutions:
  - Proper amounts and timing for birchat hamazon
  - Making a bracha in front of an improperly clad person
  - Singing Tanach verses with, or in front of, certain individuals
  - Texting during Chazarat Hashatz (don’t!)
  - Not having proper intent to be yotzeih Kiddush when someone else says it (may be better off saying it yourself)
  - Not saying each world of tachanun
  Not having proper intent in your Shmoneh Esrai (I am so with him on this one! Especially the intent going in; may be this time my thoughts won’t wander)

• Rabbi Nosson Rich -Mishna Berura Yomi: Hilchos Tzitzis 15-3

  Sizing issues for Tallit Katan.

• Rabbi Daniel Hartstein -#BringBackOurBoys-Halacha Shiur #6

  Traces the evolution of psukei d’zimrah from Tehilim by Leviim in the Beit Hamikdash and the preparations of the chasidim harishonim. What to say and why.

• Rabbi Reuven Brand -Pidyon Shevuyim: Hashkafa, History and Halacha

  Philosophically we need to share the burden with those held captive and their loved ones, even if we can’t do anything practical. Then examples throughout Jewish history and analysis of halachic sources (it’s not simple).

• רב אשר וייס – הקלויזנבורגר רבי – דברי יציב/ שפע חיים6

  R’Asher reminisces about his Rebbi as a holocaust survivor whose faith, love, dedication, prayer and efforts on behalf of others knew no bounds.

• Rav asher weiss – part 2, more stories, brisk, steipler…

  Short continuation of the above.

• Daniel Gordis on Menachem Begin in Conservative with Rabbi Meir Soloveitchik (video)

  Interesting introduction, now I understand YU/R’Meir Soloveitchik’s interest in Menachem Begin. As a failed Betari who can still sing Shir Betar (Mgov rikavon v’afar…lamut o lchboseh et hahar, Yodefet, Massada, Betar) I enjoyed the description of this principled (saving Jews) public servant.

• Rav Shurkin – Shiur 61 Lotzeis Brocha Al Yedei Telephone

  Discussion of tzitzit including defining garments, tcheilet, day vs. night wear, plus relationship to women.
  Interesting discussion of whether Shomen K’oneh (hearing is like saying) works for hearing through microphones, telephones and hearing aids. Is there a difference between them and hearing an echo? (Perhaps yes due to lack of clarity and immediacy.) Is hearing just about good vibrations (hat tip – The Beach Boys)? Seems like Chazon Ish would say so! [Related question – Can mitaseik be defined as people hearing without listening? (hat tip – Simon and Garfunkel)]

• Rabbi Reisman- Parshas Korach- Chalomos of Perfection

  Dvarim Shebelev (unarticulated thoughts) einam dvarim (have no halachic import) may only apply when there is a related action involved but not if the entire issue is thought based.
  Some very nice and important thoughts on the historically unique access we currently have to Jerusalem and the need for us to have a desire for Jerusalem (as well as an appreciation).

• The Infinite Monkey Cage-Perception

  What is reality? What is consciousness? What do we perceive and why do we try to make meaning (patterns) in everything we encounter?

• Rabbi Daniel Hartstein -#BringBackOurBoys-Halacha Shiur #7

  Tfillin for (partial or fully) lefties. Two opinions; CLOR (writing hand may be key).

• Rabbi Chayim Soloveichik-The Art of Chumra

  In taking on chumrot (stringencies) don’t paint yourself (or HKB”H) into a corner. Chumrah can be a good idea when you really have a safeik (doubt) or you have a concern you might be liable to trip in that area. It’s a bad idea when it has a negative impact on those around you or when you’ll regret it later.

• Daniel Fridman -The Unique Qualities of Learning Aggadita

  Agaddah is more accessible than halacha and has halachic impact in allowing everyone to cleave to HKB”H. Analysis of Choni Hamagal/seventy year story as well as a separate lesson to do all you can do.

• Rabbi Azarya Berzon -Mitzvot Bein Adam L’Chaveiro: What is the status of Tefilla?

  Prayer is both between Man and God and Man and Man and Man and his community.

• Rabbi Yaakov B. Neuburger -הקדמה לשביעית

  Beginning of review of Shviit rules including geography, prohibited labors, prohibited uses and the like. Interesting question – does the guarantee of blessing for Shviit observance extend to time periods when Shviit is only rabbinic in nature?

• Rabbi Azarya Berzon -Hashkafa for Parshas Korach: The autonomy of Torah and its methodology

  Review of R’YBS famous Machishei Magideha/Torah is its own discipline response to hafkaat kidushin.

• Rabbi Ya’akov Trump-Rhyme and Reason – Taamei HaMitzvos

  Discussion of Taamei Hamitzvot (reasons for commandments) including positions of Rambam, Sefer Hachinuch and R’SRH. Relationship to darshinan taameh d’kra (reasons for verses are prescriptive) also analyzed.

• The Infinite Monkey Cage-Risk 18 Nov 13

  Most people evaluate risk on an anecdotal, gut basis. Who can you trust? (me – can you even trust yourself?)

• Rabbi Ari Kahn -Bracha on non-kosher food

  If one eats non-Kosher food, do you make a blessing before eating? After? Do you make a zimmun? Is it a problem of a mitzvah dependent on a sin or is it just not considered eating? Various opinions discussed.

• Rabbi Daniel Hartstein -#BringBackOurBoys- Halacha Shiur #9

  Can you use anything besides nails to attach a mezuzah? It’s probably not optimal.

• Rabbi Jeffrey Saks , Dr. Elie Holzer -“A Philosophy of Havruta: Understanding and Teaching the Art of Text Study in Pairs”

  Dialog in learning occur with the past (text), with another (teacher/chavruta) and with self. Discusses strategies and practical tips for moving away from decoding words to decoding texts plus getting a moral education.

• Rabbi Zvi Sobolofsky -Taanis and Aveilus on Shabbos

  Status of various fasts including taanit chalom (bad dream) and applications (and reasons) for possibly fasting on Shabbat. Of particular interest (to me) was the discussion of the possible subjectivity in the definition of public and private mourning.

• Rabbi Reisman- Parhsas Bamidbar- The Baalei Tosfos

  History of Rashi and his family (Baalei Tosfot) and some particulars that each was known for.

• Rabbi Hershel Schachter -Conflict of Interest in Halacha

  I listened to this after the YU investment committee issue came to light. From what I gather, the full disclosure of the conflict of interest would have met the basic requirements of Jewish law, but not the midat chassidut level (we answer to a higher authority) I would have expected.
  Interesting insights on the higher degree of separation required in monetary matters than in ritual matters [human nature strikes again!]

• Rabbi Azarya Berzon–And they journeyed from the Mountain of Hashem”

  Importance of learning directly after prayer and setting aside time for learning. The problem with Klal Yisrael leaving Sinai was that they were too eager to leave.

• Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz -Ten Minute Halacha – Sitting Near the Door in Shul

  3 reasons given for Talmudic statement that one shouldn’t sit near the synagogue’s entry (from street) doors.
  - Makes it look like you’re eager to leave (so makom kavua solves this problem)
  - It means time not distance – so just take time to settle in
  - Sitting near door is distracting – so avoid distractions.
  We are concerned for all – try to pray in a place and manner which maximizes the chance of success.

• Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz -Hypnosis in Halacha

  Description of hypnosis – sounds like Obi Won Kenobi with the imperial traffic storm trooper (move along)! R’Moshe was concerned that it could result in for loss of control and lack of self-respect. (Me – might want to forbid Kiddush Clubs too?)

• Rabbi Daniel Hartstein -#BringBackOurBoys- Halacha Shiur #11 (rosh chodesh)

  Discussion of the nature of the “requirement” of a special Rosh Chodesh meal (like Shabbat in adding extra foodstuff). Is it based on extra holiness, remembering the mikdash (meal for witnesses) or the atonement nature? (Me – or all of the above)

• Rabbi Michael Taubes -Parshas Chukas Taamei HaMitzvos Rationale Impact Its Performance Requirements

  “Reasons” for mitzvoth – prescriptive vs. descriptive. Interesting that the Tur and Bet Yosef said not to always delve into finding them vs. Rambam who did (AIUI he wouldn’t accept that HKB”H gave us mickey mouse rules).

Please direct any informal comments to audioroundup613@comcast.net.

by Efraim Vaynman (continued from here)

Part 2

A Return to the Sources

In the prior essay, I argued that the kollel lifestyle is changing but that an imbalance exists between men and women that will exacerbate the current shidduch crisis. In this essay I will review the Talmudic sources on which the Chareidi education system bases itself to teach its daughters to want a kollel lifestyle. Through close examination and analysis of the sources I will argue that the applicability of these texts to present day society seems inappropriate.

It is not in my interest to engage in the polemics of feminist halacha. Such polemics are often colored, whether they are pro or against a progressive interpretation of halacha. My purpose here is to make a convincing argument for a community that pays no heed to such feminist discourse. Although I will argue that the role of women needs to be redefined in contemporary times, I make this argument not on my own, but to clarify that such is the view of the gedolim of the previous century whose views on this matter have already been accepted in most of Chareidi society.

The fundamental discussion focuses around a question that Rav asked R. Chiyya, “Whereby do women earn merit?”¹ The response² recorded is “By making their children go to the synagogue to learn Scripture and their husbands to the Beth Hamidrash to learn Mishnah, and waiting for their husbands until they return from the Beth Hamidrash”.³

The Talmud’s answer would seem to confirm the Chareidi viewpoint that the most important thing a Jewish woman can do to earn a share in the World-to-Come is to facilitate the learning of her husband and children. Upon closer examination of a parallel text, this answer becomes more clear.

The Mishna⁴ states that although a Sotah who is impure and committed adultery when secluded with another man will die a bitter death after drinking the Sotah water, her impending demise can be suspended for up to three years if she has some merit. The Talmud inquires:

What sort of merit? If I answer merit of [studying] Torah, she is [in the category] of one who is not commanded and fulfills!⁵

After a prolonged discussion of several possible answers that explain the merit of mitzvot, the Talmud returns to its original assumption that the merit mentioned in the Mishna is the merit of Torah. Again we find the familiar formulation, this time in the name of Ravina:

It is certainly merit of [the study of] Torah [which causes the water to suspend its effect]; and when you argue that she is in the category of one who is not commanded and fulfills, [it can be answered] that while women are not so commanded, when they have their sons taught Scripture and Mishnah and wait for their husbands until they return from the Schools, should they not share [the merit] with them?

The above quoted passage seems to be self-contradictory. At first the Talmud was reluctant to ascribe the merit to the Torah the woman herself had learned because “she is not commanded” to learn Torah and as Rashi explains her merit is not as great as one he who is commanded to learn. But then the Talmud concludes that her merit is for facilitating the learning of her husband and sons. But the original question still remains: her action, while surely meritorious, is not one in which she is commanded. The Talmud elsewhere⁶ makes it clear that he who is charged with learning himself is tasked with teaching his sons, which excludes women who are not commanded to learn. How then is the Talmud’s answer better than its first assumption?
⁷

Further, the Talmud’s rejection of its initial answer needs clarification. While it is true that women are exempt from learning Torah, the Talmud elsewhere⁸ makes it clear that one who performs a mitzvah despite being exempt from it will still receive a reward, albeit not as much one commanded in the mitzvah. Rabbi Meir even says that a gentile who learns Torah is considered like a Kohen Gadol.⁹ What, then, is the Talmud’s question that a woman who learns Torah is not commanded but fulfills? A woman, too, receives reward for learning. Perhaps it is in that merit that her impending death is delayed.¹⁰

It seems then that when the Talmud says a woman is categorized as one who is exempt and still fulfills it is implying something more than just the technical aspect of fulfillment of the mitzvah. Rather, the Talmud is saying that because women are exempt from the mitzvah, their fulfillment of the mitzvah is seen negatively.¹¹

To better understand the Talmud’s intent it is necessary to see the context of its discussion. The Mishna discusses the disagreement between Ben Azai and R. Eliezer whether it is permitted to teach women Torah:

She had scarcely finished drinking when her face turns green, her eyes protrude and her veins swell; and it is exclaimed, remove her that the temple-court be not defiled. If she possessed a merit, it [causes the water] to suspend its effect upon her. Some merit suspends the effect for one year, another for two years, and another for three years. Hence declared Ben Azzai, a man is under the obligation to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she has to drink [the water of bitterness], she may know that the merit suspends its effect. R. Eliezer says: whoever teaches his daughter Torah teaches her obscenity.¹²

The Talmud here is trying to understand the merit that the anonymous portion of the Mishna says will spare the Sotah woman for three years. Both Ben Azai and R. Eliezer seem to agree that a certain merit will spare the women. The Talmud asks which merit. It cannot be the merit of Torah, because according to R. Eliezer, women’s learning is not condoned and their learning is not meritorious at all. What then, asks the Talmud, is the merit intended by the Mishnah, to which both Ben Azai and R. Eliezer agree?

This explanation would also resolve another perplexity some of the commentaries point out. The Talmud strangely seems to assume the merit mentioned in the Mishna is of Torah. Only after rejecting this possibility does it propose that the merit could be that of some other mitzvah. This is quite strange, especially since the source for the Mishna’s statement is learnt from Nebuchadnezzar, whose life was spared for a year for giving charity.¹³ Nebuchadnezzar did a mitzvah, and even the mitzvah that he did he was not commanded in.¹⁴ Why then does the Talmud ask that women are not commanded to learn Torah; in that respect they are not different than Nebuchadnezzar who achieved merit by fulfilling a mitzvah in which he was not commanded?

Following the above-proposed explanation we can explain these difficulties. The Talmud’s assumption and its following questions concern the understanding of merit in the Mishna, even according to R. Eliezer. When Ben Azai says that “a person is obligated to teach his daughter Torah so if she will ever drink she will have a merit,” he implies that the merit mentioned is Torah. The Talmud’s question about the merit a woman received from learning Torah is based on the understanding that the merit mentioned by the anonymous part of the Mishna is also in accordance with R. Eliezer, who opposes women’s learning. The Talmud’s final resolution is that the merit is that of a woman facilitating the learning of her husband and sons, which is a deed that even R. Eliezer would consider meritorious.

My argument here is that the statement that a woman’s greatest merit in this world is facilitating the learning of her husband and sons is not a unanimous ideological declaration about the role of women in Judaism. Only according to R. Eliezer, who holds that women may not learn Torah, does the Talmud state that a woman’s greatest merit in Torah is ancillary. According to Ben Azai, who condones a woman learning, that is the biggest merit she can have, which will keep her alive. Although Ben Azai also agrees that women are not commanded to learn Torah, and presumably they will not receive the same reward for learning Torah as men who are commanded, it appears that the tremendous reward for learning is only slightly diminished and it is still greater than other mitzvot.

To be sure, R. Chiyya’s statement, although independent, also seems to be in accord with R. Eliezer’s prohibitive position. Indeed the halacha, as ruled in the Shulchan Aruch¹⁵ and almost all authorities,¹⁶ follows R. Eliezer. The emphasis on women’s secondary role in Torah study follows directly from limiting their ability to study by themselves.

Since the role of women in Torah study is contingent on their ability to learn Torah themselves, a change to women’s participation in Torah study might possibly be grounds for refocusing their spiritual goals as well.

The question then is whether women’s participation in Torah study has changed in recent times. Is the current state of women’s Torah education something sanctioned by halacha or a necessary deviation due to exigent circumstances? If the former, then the quintessential woman is one who strives to support the learning of her husband and sons. But if the latter, then perhaps it is time to reassess the role of women in Jewish society.

What the Poskim Permit

A simple reading of the Talmud seems to forbid almost all Torah learning by women.¹⁷ However, some poskim, halachic authorities, allow women more latitude in the Torah subjects they were allowed to learn. Based on inferences from the Talmud and logical arguments, many poskim permit women to learn the halachot in which they are commanded and to study the entire Tanach. Some even permit them to learn everything that men learn, including Talmud, as long as the learning is done at the woman’s own initiative.

But are these permissive rulings the source of the current praxis of women’s Jewish education? The poskim give strict parameters as to what they permit based on the Talmud. The application of these rules in the current curriculum in most Yeshivish and Modern Orthodox high schools and seminaries seems questionable. Although some of the poskim permitted women to learn Tanach, they severely limited this leniency. Rambam, who is the source of this distinction, clearly writes that women ideally should not be taught Tanach.¹⁸ Bach¹⁹ and Taz²⁰ further limited this permission to only the simplest explanation of the text. But in today’s high schools and seminaries, women are not only taught Tanach without question, but they learn it in great depth, often exceeding the level at which it is taught in male yeshivot.²¹

Similarly the permission for a self-motivated woman to learn things normally restricted to other women does not seem to be applicable to every student in a school.²² This is especially true for high school students, for whom attendance is compulsory, and is probably true for many seminaries which some students attend because of societal pressure rather a genuine desire to learn Torah.

What, then, do contemporary schools and seminaries rely on when they teach women Torah?²³ There are two approaches, both of which have support from prominent and noted rabbis.

One approach is that of the Chafetz Chaim, who famously lent his support to the then revolutionary Bais Yaakov movement. According to the Chafetz Chaim, women’s education must be more comprehensive today than what the traditional halacha permits. He allows this because “in our many sins, the education received from the father[’s home] has become very very weak…especially those who have learned how to read and write the secular languages, it is a great mitzvah to teach them Chumash, Nach, and Mussar of Chazal…so that they be imbued with belief in our holy religion. Otherwise we risk losing them completely from the path of God and they might God forbid violate all of the tenets of our religion.”²⁴

In other words, the times have changed and the emergency situation demands a new approach to women’s education. The Talmud²⁵ establishes the principle of “eit laasot lahashem“– upholding the whole Torah sometimes requires abrogating a small part of it. Extensive women’s education was not necessary in the past when women were more secluded in the home and had little exposure to the outside world.²⁶ Women with little Jewish education today are more susceptible to assimilation. To combat that, it is necessary to instill in women a strong Jewish identity and teach them the principles of our religion. Teaching women the Oral Torah is not only allowed but it an absolute necessity for the continuity of our religion.²⁷

Some take a different approach to women’s education, and instead of discussing the changed circumstances that necessitate an adjustment to women’s Torah education, they focus on the changed place of women in contemporary society.²⁸ R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik often quoted his father as saying that “if not for Rav Chaim it would be impossible to study Gemara with boys who simultaneously study science, mathematics, and physics. The Gemara would lag behind their other studies”.²⁹ R. Soloveitchik, sensitive as he was to this issue, also pushed the envelope on women’s education in the Orthodox world when he established Talmud classes for women in his Maimonides high school.³⁰ His son-in-law, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, expanded on this idea and argued that if women can learn and be involved in any other intellectual and academic field, there is no reason they should not be allowed to learn Torah on an equally advanced level.³¹

To be continued… Next installment scheduled for the morning of Thursday, July 17.
 
 

1. The question seems to be in reference to the preceding discussion that talked about a woman’s share in the world to come. See Pnei Yehoshua and Imrei No’am  ↩

2. It is not clear who is answering the question, R. Chiyya or Rav. See Pnei Yehoshua ad loc. who thinks it is Rav answering his own question.  ↩

3. Berachot 17a ↩

4. Sotah3:3 ↩

5. Sotah 21a ↩

6. Kiddushin 29b ↩

7. See Mincha Chareiva ad loc. See also Torat HaKinaot who attempts an answer based of Maharsha. Rabbi A Steinzaltz (Iyyunim ad loc) explains that Ravina means that a woman would gain more merit by splitting the merit her husband earns through his learning (in which he is commanded) than she would for learning herself. But this explanation would not sufficiently explain the mentioning of her sons who are also not required biblically to learn themselves. See also R. Eitam Henkin, “Shelat Hashivuto shel mi Sheno Metzuva vOseh”, Elon Mamre issue 120 (5767), n. 15. To me the very idea that the Talmud would simply assume that the reward for helping someone that is commanded to learn is greater than the reward for learning herself is strange and would need some type of proof to back it up. Similarly, I think the same question can be asked of those that explain the first question of the Talmud was based on the assumption that the reward of one not commanded is not enough to protect the women. Why and based on what is such an assumption? Avot 2:1 exclaims, “One does not know the reward given for mitzvot”.  ↩

8. Kiddushin 31a and Bava Kama 87a. See also Ran to Kiddushin ibid. ↩

9. Avoda Zara 3a. In Sanhedrin 59a the Talmud limits this to learning about the seven Noahide commandments.  ↩

10. This question is asked by many commentaries. See Ye’arot Dvash (Drasha 1 p. 3), Pnei Yehoshua, Imrei Noam, Ben Yehoyada, Chafetz Chaim (Chovat HaShmira ch. 13), Mincha Chareiva. ↩

11. Tiferet Zion ad loc ↩

12. Sotah 20a ↩

13. Yerushalmi Sotah 3:4 15b ↩

14. Chida in Maarit Ha’ayin ↩

15. Yoreh De’ah 246:6 ↩

16. With the exception of Piskei Riyaz who follows the general rule that the halacha is not in accord with R. Eliezer because he is a ‘shamuti’, a follower of Bet Shamai. See also Chida in Responsa Tov Ayen 4. ↩

17. For example in Yerushalmi Sotah 3:4 16a R. Eliezer refuses to answer a woman’s question about the Biblical story of the sin of the golden calf. In Masechet Sofrim 18:8 it is stated more clearly that even in the plain meaning of the Chumash women do not have any business knowing. On his inaugural day as Rosh Yeshiva, R. Elazar ben Azaria is recorded as saying that “Men come to [the Hakhel ceremony] to hear (learn), women come to receive reward for their steps, and children, why are they brought? To give reward for their bringers.” It should be noted that the day R. Elazar ben Azaria displaced Rabban Gamliel is celebrated as day when the Beit Medrash became more inclusive and people previously not allowed in were allowed. Apparently his inclusiveness for more people to study Torah did not extend to women.  ↩

18. Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:13 ↩

19. Yoreh De’ah 246 s.v. vhu shkatav. In addition he rules that women may not be taught “derech kevah” on a regular basis.  ↩

20. Yoreh De’ah 246:4 s.k. 4. The Shoel U’Meishiv 4:41 rules like the Taz. ↩

21. Tzitz Eliezer 9:3 cites the Shulchan Aruch Harav who makes a distinction between the written and oral Torah without Rambam’s qualification. This might also be the opinion of Piskei Rid, Nedarim 37b. R. Menachem Mendel Schneersohn in Likutei Sichot, Vol. 14 p. 150 n. 12 disagrees with this understanding of the Shulchan Aruch Harav. Even if scripture can be learned without qualification it would seem that these opinions would agree that learning that departs from the actual explanation of the text to a deeper understanding of what the text relates would still be prohibited. See Hagahot Maharatz Chajes, Sotah 21b. ↩

22. R. Moshe Weinberger, “Teaching Torah to Women”, printed in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, 9 (Spring 1985), p. 47 n. 61. He writes, “These scholars would also agree that the fact that a girl attends high school does not necessarily mean she is either mature or serious in terms of Torah study.” ↩

23. There are some schools, in particular those of Satmar and the Eida HaChareidis, that truly do limit the curriculum to only those halachot that pertain to women, but the overwhelming majority of girls schools, even in the Chareidi world, have an expanded curriculum which includes material that none of the traditional leniencies allow for. I should also note that the answers I assert are not necessarily the answers the school administrator would admit to. Unfortunately the exact parameters of the leniencies are commonly not properly understood and some administrators are under the impression that they adhere to the strict interpretation of the law. ↩

24. Likutei Halachot to Sotah 21 in the footnote.  ↩

25. Mishna Brachot 9:5 ↩

26. R. Meir Hershkowitz, OhrOr Hamizrach 17:3 p. 130-131. “I say that [the prohibition to teach women Torah] was only in old times, when a woman’s only wisdom was that with a spindle, and she watched the doors of her house, and of the outside world she knew nothing…and therefore I say that in our times it is very important for the sake of preserving the religion that they be taught Torah, and all of it will be considered like learning about the ‘mitzvot that she keeps’.” ↩

27. R. Zalman Sorotzkin, Responsa Moznayim L’Mishpat 1:42. “Not only is it permitted to teach Torah and Yirat Shamayim to the daughters of this generation but there is an absolute obligation to do so, and it is a big mitzvah to establish girls schools…and it is even permitted to teach a woman Torah sh’Bal Peh, that is the end verdict without having to resort to [halachically questionable discursive] questions and answers.” ↩

28. It is not only the left wing and centrist poskim that support this heter for women’s learning but the right wing as well. In Orchot Rabbeinu vol. 1 p. 193 it is recorded that R’ Chaim Kanievsky asked the Chazon Ish if it was permitted to acquiesce to his sister’s request that he learn Gemara with her. The Chazon Ish responded that it was permitted so as long as it was done only from time to time. The Steipler Gaon ruled it was permitted to teach women Mishnayot nowadays. R. Aryeh Zev Ginzberg in his responsa Divrei Chachamim p. 278 records that he heard from R. Shneur Kotler that “halachically there is no prohibition [to teach them Gemara] nowaday, but it should not be done…because they do not have an obligation to learn, and you should oppose one that tries to do this.” R. Ginzberg records that he heard similarly from R. Yaakov Kamenetsky that “nowadays there is no halachic objection to them learning [Gemara] but it should still not be done.” R. Ginzberg explains that they hesitated to actually permit it because they realized that the main thrust of those advocating for women’s learning was coming from feminists who do not have pure intentions. This is also the conclusion of Ilan Fuchs, Jewish Women’s Torah Study, p. _ in explaining contradictory rulings by R. Moshe Feinstein one in which he permitted a woman to give a shiur to other women in Talmud while in his printed responsa he forbids the study of Mishnayot in a girls school. Fuchs says the when R. Feinstein sensed that impetus was feminism he ruled stringently.  ↩

29. The Rav, Aaron Rakffet-Rothkoff (1999) volume 2, p. 42. Rabbi Soloveitchik continued, “Now the Gemara does not lag behind any philosophical approach, even the most modern analytical approach. We can compete with the most profound and the most precise philosophical analysis of today.” ↩

30. Seth Farber, An American Orthodox Dreamer: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Boston’s Maimonides School, Brandeis Series in American Jewish History, Culture, and Life (2003), chp. 4.
    The reason why R. Soloveitchik condoned women’s Talmud study is a matter of dispute. Walter Wurtzberger, in his article, “Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posek of Post-Modern Orthodoxy”, Tradition 29:1 (1994), p. 17-18, relates the version more popularly known, that R. Soloveitchik “was convinced that under contemporary conditions, it was necessary to confront the challenge of modernity, and therefore Jewish women must be provided with the intellectual resources needed to appreciate the meaning of halakhic Judaism.” R. Soloveitchik’s own grandson, R. Mayer Twersky, maintains that his grandfather’s opinion was that only optional study of Torah sh’Bal Peh was forbidden by Talmudic injunction. Accordingly, since he, like the Chafetz Chaim before him, maintained that in modern times women must be taught more halacha, it was permitted to teach these sections of Torah sh’Bal Peh in a school setting. R. Twersky stresses that the difference between what the Chafetz Chaim advocated and what his grandfather sanctioned is just a matter of magnitude but not a fundamental disagreement of the underlying argument. See his article, “A Glimpse of the Rav: Talmud Torah for Women and the Mehitsa Controversy”, Women and the Study of Torah, ed. Joel Wolowelsky, Ktav (2001), p. 49-54. Farber, ibid p. 83, brings both opinions and sides with Wurtzberger. See also Moshe A. Mozeson, “Chinukh Banot (Im Horaot R. Soloveitchik)”, Hadarom 66-67 (1993), p. 63-66.

    In this light it is interesting to note a letter by Jeffery R. Woolf, quoted in Women, Jewish Law, and Modernity, p. 143 n. 146. According to Woolf, R. Soloveitchik “explicitly provided for co-education in grades K-12, thus ensuring equal education for all enrolled in the school. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that until the time of his illness and subsequent retirement, he never veered from the position that such an arrangement was legitimate and halakhically justified, ab initio, and not a begrudged ex-post-facto concession. Indeed the current administration of the school, under the guidance of the Rav’s daughter, Dr. Atarah Twersky, bears this fact out fully. (I am going out of my way to emphasize this point, as there is significant amount of conscious ‘historical revisionism’ in the Orthodox community which seeks to portray Rav Soloveitchik’s position in a different light.)” ↩

31. See his essay “Ba’ayot haYesod b’Hinuch shel ha’Isha”, transcribed and edited by Ben-Zion Rosenfeld in HaIsha v’Chinucha: Asufat Maamarim b’Halakha u’bMachshava, ed. Ben-Zion Rosenfeld, Emunah, Kfar Saba 1979, p. 157. R. Lichtenstein also stresses the reason of the Chafetz Chaim, noting that today many women attend universities where they encounter a different worldview and philosophies often antithetical to Judaism. In his opinion “what a woman needs to know to have a proper Torah education is far beyond what they are being taught today.” A nephew of R. Soloveitchik, R. Moshe Meiselman, writes similarly, “No authorities ever meant to justify the perverse modern-day situation in which women are allowed to become sophisticatedly conversant with all cultures other than their own.” See his chapter “Torah Knowledge for Women” in his book Jewish Women in Jewish Law, Ktav/Yeshiva University Press, 1978, p. 40. I should point out that this approach implicitly acknowledges the contextual aspect of the rabbinic injunction against women’s learning. See Responsa Aseh L’cha Rav 2:52 from R. Haim David HaLevi who writes so explicitly.  ↩